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31 August 1965

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : The Long Range Plan
of the Central Intelligence Agency

1. I have the honor to present to you the Long Range Plan of the Central Intelligence Agency which has been prepared under my direction by representatives of the four Directorates and the Office of Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower. While I undertook this responsibility with apprehension, it is with pleasure that I now present to you the first draft of a long range plan. While none of us who participated in the preparation of this document would ascribe to it infallibility, we are nevertheless confident that we have charted a course for the Agency which is in the best interests of the United States Government.

2. It gives me pleasure to inform you that I have received the most unanimously enthusiastic cooperation in this effort that I have ever experienced in the 18 years of the Agency. Each of the Directorates assigned to this task senior officials of great ability and considerable

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experience: [REDACTED]

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J. J. Hitchcock from the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence;

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[REDACTED] from the Deputy Directorate for Plans;

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[REDACTED] from the

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Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology; [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] from the Deputy Directorate for Support;

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and [REDACTED] from the Office of Budget, Program Analysis and

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Manpower. The staff was headed by [REDACTED] who was assisted

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by [REDACTED] of the Office of Budget, Program Analysis and
Manpower, and without their considerable expertise and assistance, the
report could not have been finished by its deadline. Perhaps even more
important for the future is the fact that all of the above named are con-
vinced that the preparation of an Agency plan and permanent planning is
long overdue, and thus the work of a permanent planning staff has
already gained considerable momentum. Finally, this effort has served
to develop an Agency viewpoint which has never before been so apparent.

3. After careful examination of the responsibilities and the
duties of the Central Intelligence Agency as established by law and the
National Security Council, the most profound conviction of the Planning
Group was of the importance of the Agency's work. It is national in
scope and outlook. It provides a centralized and coordinated intelligence

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viewpoint for the President. It is a strong, independent voice and should always remain so even though at times its views are unpopular. It uses what other intelligence organizations produce in compiling national intelligence and it does not interfere with departmental activities. It is essential to national security.

4. I was very mindful, in the preparation of this plan, of your conversation with Congressman George Mahon and the injunction that it should not simply serve as a justification for an expanding organization or a hunting license for empire building. The Planning Group examined with great care and thoroughness each of the objectives presented by the various components, and you will find the individual Directorate presentations available in the annexes to the basic document. We also examined with great thoroughness the future implications of these programs. I must report to you that the Central Intelligence Agency cannot continue to accept these responsibilities and to perform them in a manner expected by the United States Government at its present size. Thus, while for planning purposes we have assumed that CIA will continue to have all of these responsibilities--and the proposals presented reflect this--if the Government reaches a conscious decision that the Agency should not expand to the degree that we propose, then it must relieve the Agency of some of these responsibilities. This, in fact, is the only way in which CIA could continue at its present strength.

5. It would appear that the time is appropriate for the highest level of the United States Government to decide what price it wishes to pay for the information it needs to reach appropriate policy decisions. If the U. S. Government wishes to have timely and accurate intelligence on all areas of the world and to respond to each crisis affecting the security interests of the nation with policy decisions based upon the soundest information available that has been properly analyzed by experts, then it cannot expect to obtain this inexpensively. The Central Intelligence Agency must be allowed to grow to meet ever increasing demands from the Government for intelligence on a world that becomes constantly more complex. It would not seem inappropriate to suggest that the Bureau of the Budget study the proposition that a certain proportion of the Federal budget--or even of the gross national product--should properly be allocated to its intelligence system. The other alternative is one best not to contemplate in that with inadequate intelligence not thoroughly analyzed and studied, the United States Government might well find itself committed to the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time.

6. While a superficial reading of this paper might give the impression that we found much to criticize, this would not be a true reflection of our views. We did find inadequacies and problems, but we

found these because we were mindful of the President's injunction to you that he wanted CIA to be the world's best intelligence service. For example, the Agency's capability for intelligence analysis and production has remained at a relatively constant level while there has been an information explosion as a result of improved mass collection systems such as photographic satellites with the result that the volume of reporting has expanded vastly while the number of analysts remained constant. Similarly, as the security interests of the United States have expanded to include virtually every inhabited spot on earth, the requirements for clandestine collection and covert action have greatly increased and have proportionately inhibited the Agency's efforts to build a long range, truly clandestine apparatus--an effort which is vitally important. Far more important than the weaknesses we touch upon are the tremendous accomplishments of this organization over the years and the fact that it provides the soundest possible base for the future--a magnificent cadre of highly trained and dedicated professional intelligence officers.

7. I would suggest that you consider this paper as the first draft of the Agency's Long Range Plan. It presents projections and the order of magnitude of major problems facing the Agency, with special attention and treatment for those areas of critical importance. In a world in which change is the principal common denominator of human

activity, then a plan must be constantly revised, updated, and improved. Your directive establishing a permanent Agency planning staff will accomplish this.

8. What this plan says in broadest terms can be summarized succinctly:

a. The Agency must be prepared to fulfill its responsibilities both for collection and production on a world-wide basis in an atmosphere which for the foreseeable future will be one of crisis, conflict, and confrontation.

b. Recognizing that in the past two decades scientific progress has been proportionately greater than in all previous recorded history, the Agency will be operating in a universal arena where major break-throughs affecting the relations between nations must be anticipated as a matter of course.

c. To do the job of national intelligence production which the United States Government has a right to expect, the Agency must have considerably greater depth in analysts, especially in the political intelligence field and that of strategic warning, and must assist their work by leading in the field of automatic data processing and analysis.

d. Similarly, the Agency cannot provide a world-wide clandestine intelligence and covert action network with a capability for covert paramilitary operations where required unless its Clandestine Services, which are presently stretched exceedingly taut by world-wide commitments, are allowed to expand with a developmental complement and to create in depth capacity for operational research.

e. All of the foregoing points obviously to the necessity for research in mission-oriented fields, particularly those directly related to doing a better international job, and this must be nurtured and fostered by the Agency.

f. Accompanying this expansion of the organization must be a proportionate increase in such areas as security, communications, and training, to continue to provide the same degree of support facilities for the organization.

9. Internally, I suggest that this report be read and reviewed by the Agency's Executive Committee and that upon consideration of their views you refer it to the Executive Director-Comptroller for implementation,

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or for further study by the Agency's permanent Planning Staff, as appropriate. By separate memorandum I am presenting a proposed charter for the Agency's permanent Planning Staff.

10. I also recommend that you consider showing this report to the most senior officials of the United States Government for their personal perusal. It would be of major assistance to the national security effort if the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Security Advisor to the President, the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Director of the Budget would take the time in their busy schedules to acquaint themselves with the future of an organization which may well be the key to survival. I feel so strongly that we have charted the right course toward the objective of the President to provide him with the world's best intelligence service, that I would be happy to defend this plan before any forum at any place at any time.

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Lyman Kirkpatrick

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PART I

OVER VIEW OF THE CIA LONG RANGE PLAN

I. In a few short years the Central Intelligence Agency has developed the resources, techniques, and expertise which has enabled it to carry out its unique responsibilities rapidly and responsibly. This has been affirmed and reaffirmed by four Presidents and the overwhelming majority of responsible officials of Government. Nonetheless, the Central Intelligence Agency is not immune to the technological revolution, the rapid explosion in communications, and the burgeoning unrest which characterize the world today. These rapidly evolving changes have special implications for intelligence which must be heeded if we are to meet the challenges of the future.

II. The technological revolution has provided intelligence with a wealth of new information largely pertaining to the capabilities of other nations, and means have been and continue to be developed for its exploitation and analysis. However, as yet adequate sources and techniques have not been provided for determining the intentions of potentially hostile nations. The numbers of intelligence consumers and their demands for intelligence in greater detail have increased in a measure

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which was unforeseen when the concept of strategic intelligence was first formulated. Over the years the range of intelligence has also broadened to encompass the total spectrum of today's conflict--economic, social, and psychological as well as military and political. Concurrently, there has been an increased demand, which will not diminish, for "instant intelligence" vital for early warning of all types. Perhaps the most significant recent change in intelligence concerns the processing and analysis of information. For many years and for good reason, intelligence was primarily concerned with means of collecting information of all kinds. It is abundantly clear at this time that our ability to process and analyze raw information has not kept pace with our collection capability.

III. During the past few weeks the Planning Group has examined the future of the Central Intelligence Agency and presents what it believes to be a sound and rational direction for the future. The Planning Group identified and developed those themes which are of utmost importance to the future posture of the Agency. It is important to point out what this plan is not. It is not a simple compilation of Directorate views.

IV. The Planning Group is deeply concerned by the difficulties facing the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) which is faced with an overload of photographic data without the resources for proper analysis. However, the Planning Group recognizes the NPIC problem

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as a dramatic example of a general phenomenon within the community which we call "information explosion." Information explosion is also apparent in many other analytical offices in the Agency and applies to our early warning capability, signal analysis, and other basic intelligence activities. Therefore, the plan highlights the critical need for a high priority and aggressive program aimed at increased use of automatic data processing and more sophisticated techniques for data analysis. The annexes do, however, give indications of the programs which might be undertaken to solve the NPIC as well as other related data analysis problems.

V. The increased demands for national intelligence not only dictate the need for more rapid communication of information collected by technical means but serve to underline the unique contribution which the Clandestine Services provide with respect to intentions. Broader dissemination of clandestinely obtained information requires more rigorous control of the source of this valuable information if the Clandestine Services are to play an increasingly effective role in intelligence.

VI. The Planning Group found that there were certain common problems which could be identified. The commonality of problems became more apparent in the course of our briefings and discussions.

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VII. A plan must consider existing resources and functions and in recommending new programs must consider what can be removed from current efforts in order to provide the resources necessary to meet new challenges. There is no question that each and every office or division within the Agency could find certain on-going activities which, if curtailed or modified, would provide savings in funds and manpower. However, such economies, no matter how rigorously instituted, would not significantly reduce the budget and manpower requirements of the Agency but would affect the responsibilities of the Agency.

VIII. We are in a paradoxical situation. There is no question that the demands for intelligence will increase quantitatively and qualitatively. There is also no question that simply adding manpower and personnel under the misguided concept that we can do everything for everybody will prove disastrous. What is clear from the deliberations of the group is that major improvements in the effectiveness of the Agency will be the result of better analysis of the operations of intelligence. Indeed, minor changes in services performed, a decision to cut out certain aspects of basic intelligence may serve to obscure the real nature of the problem and prove costly in the long run.

IX. Consideration was given to the role of national current intelligence. Those responsible for national intelligence production are

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concerned about the gradual erosion of their basic capability for strategic intelligence in their effort to serve tactical and current requirements. If it is clear that we must serve both purposes, then it must also be clear that it will cost us in resources. History shows that the overbalance toward current intelligence without adequate support to the basic in-depth research on the capabilities and intentions of our adversaries could be the most dangerous and perhaps fatal error which we could commit.

X. It should be apparent on reading the plan that the overwhelming emphasis of the Planning Group has been on the substantive and operational aspects of intelligence with less discussion regarding organizational and legislative problems.

XI. It bears repeating that this plan, like any plan that is worthwhile, is not an end but a beginning.

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PART II

LONG RANGE PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

I. The Future

A. The intelligence responsibilities and obligations of the Central Intelligence Agency have increased in number and grown apace with the international involvements and national security considerations of the U.S. over the past decade. The Agency's responsibilities and programs are world-wide and it is certain that the upcoming ten or fifteen years will see major increases in the needs of the highest levels of the Government for the Agency's intelligence and operations.

B. In preparing a meaningful long range plan for CIA, it is necessary as a first step to present a statement of probable future world developments in order to understand the type and scope of requirements to be met by intelligence and the general environment in which intelligence will operate.

II. The Probable World Situation

A. In the broadest sense it can be assumed that within the time span of this plan the world situation will continue along lines which now seem apparent.

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1. General. Nuclear war involving the U.S. will remain a possibility during the period of this plan. Non-nuclear wars, limited wars, and armed insurrections and rebellions will occur from time to time, often simultaneously, and will involve U.S. interests. Some of them will threaten U.S. security interests and some of them will involve U.S. armed forces and/or CIA covert paramilitary forces.

2. The Soviet Union, Communist China, and Other Communist Countries. The principal antagonists of the U.S. will be the USSR and Communist China. China will acquire during this period the capability for nuclear attack and the U.S. will be faced with two formidable Communist power centers. Both the USSR and China will continue and increase efforts to extend their influence into Free World areas, sometimes in competition with each other, through political, economic, and subversive means. Sino-Soviet difficulties and the lessening of Soviet control over Eastern European satellites may from time to time offer opportunities for advancing U.S. interests. However, there will be no real diminution of the threat these countries

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present to the U.S. Similarly, other Communist countries will be generally hostile to U.S. and aligned, with varying degrees of firmness, either to the USSR or Communist China.

3. Far East and Southeast Asia. There will be no lessening of Communist China's efforts to dominate this area. Under the guise of supporting nationalism and wars of liberation, it will work actively to foment and covertly support dissidence in these countries whose stability will remain precarious. Southeast Asia will remain in the foreseeable future a major battlefield in the Communist-Free World confrontation, although the current conflict in Vietnam will be resolved politically or militarily within the next five years. Japan will play an increasingly independent and important role in world affairs, and in particular, can be expected to expand its relations with Communist China. Indonesia, Taiwan, divided Korea, and India-Pakistan will pose major problems.

4. Near East/South Asia. The Communist Bloc through increased activity and an expanding presence

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in this area will continue attempts to reduce U.S. / Western prestige. This area will be used by the Bloc over the period of this plan as a bridgehead for the neutralization of NATO and CENTO and for the penetration of Black Africa through political, economic, military, and subversive means. The Arab-Israeli dispute will continue and will always present the possibility of starting what could be a major conflagration. The countries in this area will continue to be unstable domestically and in their international alignment. Limited conflicts will occur from time to time which will require U.S. intervention either overtly or covertly.

5. Latin America. The governments of Latin American countries are inherently unstable and the causes of instability will continue in the foreseeable future. However, the prospects for Communist Parties gaining control of a Latin American country by revolutionary or parliamentary means cannot be discounted. Within the next ten-year period nationalism will continue to increase and will be expressed in attitudes and actions against the U.S. Communist China will show a growing interest and activity

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in stirring agitation and dissidence, while Cuba will continue to launch subversive efforts against countries in the area. A Castro-type government will probably continue in Cuba through the 1970s. The USSR will continue to pursue its objectives in Latin America by political means and will support groups which are responsive to its direction.

6. Africa. This entire continent will remain subject to internal instability, rebellion, and international conflict providing opportunities which the USSR and Communist China will certainly endeavor to exploit. Wars of liberation, armed rebellion, and frontier and racial conflict will occur with frequency, most of which will involve basic U.S. interests to some degree, some will threaten U.S. security interests, and some will require covert U.S. paramilitary action. Former colonial powers will continue to play a significant role in their areas of influence. The UK and Belgium will remain basically friendly to the U.S. and will cooperate. France will likely pursue an independent policy designed to contain U.S. influence while Portugal will view the U.S. as a major threat to its African interest.

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7. Western Allies. It is expected that our close allies (i. e., Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada) will remain basically friendly, though there will be occasional conflicts of interest with them. The transition periods in France, Spain, and Portugal after the passing of their aged leaders will be troublesome. It is likely that NATO will be significantly altered within the next five years. European industry will be strong in competition with the U.S. and there will be an acceleration of trade ties between Europe and East-Bloc countries which could modify existing power relations. Within fifteen years Europe may become increasingly independent of U.S. leadership--economically, politically, and militarily creating another force in world affairs.

III. The Impact of Technology

A. In addition to the comprehensive requirements for national intelligence which can be derived from the above, and in light of unparalleled scientific progress over the past fifteen years, it is clear that continued technological advances in the coming years will affect both the capabilities of foreign countries, the relations and balance of power

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between nations, and thus the targets and operations of the Agency's intelligence efforts. The competition in strategic weapons systems and in the exploration of outer space has already effected enormous changes in intelligence means and methods. The most obvious effect of technological progress will be Communist China's early acquisition of a nuclear strike capability and the growth and proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities in several other countries. Additionally, however, technical breakthroughs could occur which in other respects would greatly modify the power of countries and which could, depending upon circumstances, either be the reason for or the reason for not pursuing aggressive courses. Examples would include means for controlling weather, for producing cheap and abundant power, water, and food (including the possibility of efficient exploitation of oceanic resources), and other developments such as effective population control.

IV. The Impact on CIA

A. Over the next ten to fifteen years the U.S. Government will probably see no lessening of problems in its international relations and in the protection of its security interests. The requirements for current and estimative intelligence in support of policy decisions and actions will increase in both scope and intensity as will the need for covert collection, counterintelligence, and covert political, economic, and military actions.

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B. The spread of technical and other material advances throughout the world may, within the span of this plan, equip several countries with nuclear weapons and some sort of delivery capability, although it be limited to a local area. The need will grow, therefore, for improved clandestine collection and for technical programs capable of sampling larger environments at greater distances from targets, incorporating "real-time," high-volume, discriminating techniques in processing raw data. Similarly, the storage, retrieval, and preliminary analysis of information prior to intelligence research and analysis will present problems of increasing severity. Even in the basic intelligence field, there will be a national requirement for more intensive intelligence to predict more accurately the impact of technology on foreign social, political, economic, and military environments and for more sophisticated methods for intelligence in support of and in carrying out covert actions and counterinsurgency intelligence operations.

PART III

THE PRESENT AND FUTURE ROLE OF CIA

I. General

A. At the outset in long range planning for the Central Intelligence Agency it is necessary to examine its present and future responsibilities, bearing in mind that while the National Security Act of 1947 which created the Agency describes certain functions for the organization, the evolution of the intelligence community, the changing roles and responsibilities of other departments and agencies, and the creation of new agencies have all served to affect the activities of the CIA. It is equally important to CIA's planning that there be clear understanding within the U. S. Government of the Agency's responsibility and authority. It is therefore believed essential that the Agency continue and intensify efforts to brief selected Congressmen and Congressional staff members, taking into account their continuing and special interests and including discussions of CIA's functions and responsibilities in general. Such briefings should also be initiated for the Executive Branch of the Government, including particularly such policy groups as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board. While it is realized that the DCI must carry the principal burden in briefing U. S. Government officials, greater use of second echelon officers of CIA, as feasible, would increase the scope of the Agency's efforts in this area without increasing the Director's already heavy schedule.

II. War Planning

A. The role of the CIA in wartime is not fully understood or accepted by the member agencies of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). In 1957, the National Security Council instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to proceed with the development of war plans for the intelligence community. The Director took the position that it would be necessary first to develop directives governing peacetime arrangements. During the ensuing two years, various National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID) defining foreign intelligence responsibilities of the USIB member agencies were published. In 1959 the Emergency Planning Steering Committee (never formally constituted or recognized by the USIB) initiated a study which was concerned largely with emergency relocation--only one facet of war planning. The Committee ceased to function when the Board reached an impasse on the intelligence advisory role of the DCI to the President during wartime.

B. The CIA Act of 1947 makes no distinction between the peacetime and the wartime roles of the DCI or the Agency. The Act provides all of the authority needed by the Agency for the pursuit of wartime activities. Positive assertion of existing statutory authority in the form of a CIA war plan is needed. Subsequent planning should integrate the wartime roles of the USIB member agencies.

C. Paragraph 8 of National Security Council Intelligence Directive 5 and the Command Relationships Agreement (between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense) place the Agency's forces operating in or from an active theatre of war under the command of the Theatre Commander. The Theatre Commander would be under the operational control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

D. Relationships between CIA Headquarters and the military command structure in time of war have not been defined. As matters now stand, CIA would tend to lose its forces located in an active theatre of war and would be without any plan of action for the wartime operation of the remainder of the Agency. It is imperative that CIA clarify its mission in war and its relations with the Department of Defense.

E. The Agency is small in size as compared to the military. Its real worth is based upon qualitative characteristics and a quick reaction capability. Being irregular and unorthodox by nature, its

activities and capabilities are little understood by the military. Its field components cannot operate effectively without the resources and guidance of CIA Headquarters.

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III. The DCI and Warning

A. As Chairman of USIB, the DCI is the senior intelligence officer concerned with warning. The USIB's formal intelligence warning mechanism--the Watch Committee and its staff, the National Indications Center--reports to USIB by the terms of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/5 and the Chairman of the Watch Committee is designated by the DCI after consultation with USIB. We have dealt with early warning in Section D of Part III.

IV. Intelligence Production

A. The Agency's role in the production of intelligence has

been quite well established in most areas, both by law and by directive, as being charged with the production of national intelligence. In some areas of intelligence production this is more specifically established than in others, and therefore in planning it is important that it be firmly established in all areas where the Agency must make major commitments. In this regard the National Security Act of 1947 states,

"(b) for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council--(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities."

What this says in simplest modern-day terms is that the Agency is charged with producing national intelligence.

B. The responsibility for the production of National Intelligence Estimates has been clearly established by common practice over the years and is spelled out in DCID 1/1. This is one of the most important responsibilities of the Agency and has created for the United States Government a document of incalculable value in which the greatest objectivity of the intelligence system provides the policymaker with the top intelligence viewpoint. Its integrity should be preserved at all costs in the interests of national security, most particularly the responsibility of an independent agency for its production.

C. The responsibility for national current intelligence is less clearly established by directive although it appears that there is a clear understanding with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as to the division of responsibilities. In the negotiations conducted in 1962 and 1963 between the Agency and DIA, specifically the Executive Director-Comptroller and Deputy Director for Intelligence of CIA and the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Administration, and the Director of DIA, a clear understanding was reached that DIA produced departmental current intelligence while CIA produced national current intelligence. However, this has not been inscribed in any directive and this should be done at an early date in order to insure logical organizational development both within the Agency and the Department of Defense that will implement the agreement.

D. The Foreign Missiles and Space Analysis Center (FMSAC) was established by the DCI as a means of meeting his statutory responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947 to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and to provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government. The then Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, expressed the view that his authority to form such an organization was clear and he felt there was no need for supporting documents--i. e., NSCIDs and DCIDs. No additional action is believed necessary at this time.

E. The production of national economic intelligence on specified areas of the world was established as a CIA responsibility by letter from the DCI, General Walter Bedell Smith, to Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. This was formally delineated in DCID 3/1 which assigns to CIA primary responsibility for the production of economic intelligence on the Communist countries. The DCI in March of this year advised the Secretary of State that he found it necessary to develop within CIA a limited capability for economic analysis on non-Communist countries as well. In the fields of military-economic intelligence CIA has also undertaken to supplement intelligence produced elsewhere in order to provide essential contributions to National Intelligence Estimates on military questions and to provide the support required by the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his responsibilities to the President. Research relating to the cost and resource impact of foreign military and space programs has been recognized by the Department of Defense as a primary responsibility of CIA. Finally, the coordination of economic intelligence is carried out through the Economic Intelligence Committee, chaired by a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency in accordance with DCID 3/1.

F. The responsibility for the production of national basic intelligence as typified by the National Intelligence Surveys is clearly established and is specified in NSCID 3, paragraph la, b, c, d, and e. However, there is considerable duplication of effort in the broad area of basic intelligence, since each community organization produces intelligence for different purposes and can clearly establish that their product is not identical with the National Intelligence Surveys and within the military area basic intelligence is often produced under contract from non-intelligence components. Basic intelligence research and production is therefore an area in which there is considerable uncontrolled and uncoordinated effort. It is recommended that in planning for the future the entire area of basic intelligence, not just the production of National Intelligence Surveys, be subjected to intensive scrutiny and clearly delineated responsibilities be established in order to insure orderly progress. While this is being done--it may take a matter of years--the CIA should continue to carry the responsibility for the production of the National Intelligence Surveys.

G. Present and future demands on the Director emphasize the importance of completing the Agency's strategic base in research by extending it in political intelligence. This is an area as critical as it is difficult. It is a major challenge, but must be met if intelligence

is to match its findings in hostile capabilities with correlative insight into intentions. In recent years the State Department has more and more withdrawn from this field and devoted its limited resources to quick support of policy. The Agency does not have a "charter" for political research and does not ask for one. There are gaps here which must be filled in the national interest and CIA means to fill them.

H. Responsibility for the Agency's production of finished intelligence on all foreign scientific and technical activities rests with the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) under the authority of National Security Council Intelligence Directive 3 and Director of Central Intelligence Directives 3/3 for atomic energy, 3/4 for guided missiles and astronautics, and 3/5 for other scientific and technical intelligence. The pertinent citations in NSCID 3 are contained in paragraph 7c ("the CIA shall produce . . . scientific and technical intelligence as a service of common concern") and 7d on atomic energy intelligence. DCID 3/3 and 3/4 both state in paragraph 2 that the production of intelligence on atomic energy and guided missiles and astronautics is the responsibility of all departments and agencies represented on the USIB. Paragraph 2a of DCID 3/5 reiterates paragraph 7c of NSCID 3 that the CIA shall produce scientific and technical intelligence as a service of common concern "and as required to fulfill the statutory responsibilities of the DCI." Thus OSI

produces intelligence in nearly every phase of foreign military research and development consistent with its manpower capabilities and external research facilities.

V. National Reference Services

A. Over the years CIA has developed certain national intelligence reference services required for independent intelligence production by the Agency in direct support of the DCI, to support assigned intelligence responsibilities and to provide services of common support to the community. The simultaneous development of reference services by each of the USIB intelligence organizations would be costly, duplicative, and unnecessary. This is an area where the attention of the DCI is needed in order to reach agreement with the military agencies and the Department of State as to the responsibility for the development and maintenance of national intelligence reference services of common concern. It is also clear that this Agency's ability to cope with its own immediate needs for information handling, much less to move toward a more centralized community effort, will depend heavily, if not entirely, upon the use of automatic data processing techniques. The Agency's future need for automatic data processing is, therefore, given special emphasis later on in this plan.

B. The Central Intelligence Agency now has firmly established its responsibility for the maintenance of a national reference service in the field of biographic intelligence dealing with all foreign personalities outside of the military field. This is an important service and should be maintained. Its charter is DCID 1/9.

C. The CIA also has an established national intelligence reference service responsibility in the field of the acquisition and indexing of foreign documents. This is prescribed in DCID 2/4 and is one of the better coordinated efforts in the Federal Government.

D. While CIA's library and substantive intelligence files are at the present time used more extensively by other agencies than by CIA--and this is as it should be--this is nevertheless one area where centralization and coordination can achieve savings for the intelligence community. With substantive intelligence documents entering the system at a rate in excess of a million a month, it is obviously wasteful for each agency to plan to file the identical documents. On the other hand, each agency obviously has the right to be able to retrieve immediately documents on any subject which it may need. It is therefore important that the DCI insist on the clear delineation of responsibility in the intelligence system for the storage and retrieval of substantive documents.

VI. Intelligence Collection

25X1 A. [redacted] positive foreign intelligence information as a service of common concern on behalf of the entire intelligence system is a well established responsibility of the Agency as prescribed in DCID 2/8, [redacted]


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B. The Central Intelligence Agency by intent of Congress is responsible for the conduct of Federally directed espionage and counterespionage abroad. This has been directed in NSCID 5 which also provides that the armed services may participate in clandestine operations for departmental purposes provided that their efforts are coordinated with the designated representatives of the DCI. This requires especial attention to the necessity for the security implications of clandestinity.

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D. NSCID 6, which covers the subject of Communications Intelligence, establishes the DCI as the executive agent of USIB responsible for relationships with other nations to gain the benefit of the Communications Intelligence activities they perform.

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F. The Central Intelligence Agency conducts covert overhead reconnaissance as appropriate to the target and circumstances. The Agency's research and development associated with overhead reconnaissance is recognized and should be continued. NSCID 8 provides

the authority for the DCI to provide a National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) as a service of common concern in consultation with interested members of USIB. According to this directive, the NPIC will produce and disseminate photo interpretation reports, provide materials and services in support of the national intelligence effort, and other such additional support to departments and agencies as can be provided without degradation of the other services mentioned. It should be noted that this directive provides that NPIC be transferred to the Department of Defense in time of war. This should be reviewed in the context of the Agency's wartime role referred to in paragraph II above.

VII. Covert Action

A. CIA is responsible for the national effort in the field of covert action, specifically political, psychological, and economic warfare. This is under NSC 5412 and is under the specific direction of the 303 Committee.

B. CIA is responsible for covert paramilitary activities as prescribed by NSC 5412 and NSAM 57.

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D. In planning for the future, the Agency should assume that it will continue to have all of these responsibilities and that it will be held responsible for their fulfillment in the national interest.

VIII. Communications

A. National Security Action Memorandum No. 252, dated 11 July 1963, established the National Communications System to provide necessary communications for the Federal Government. This NSAM formalized the role that CIA had played since its inception in operating a combined communications system with State Department, interfaced with Defense communications. Continuation of this national role helps assure the availability of adequate secure communications for the Agency.

PART III - SECTION A

THE LONG RANGE OUTLOOK
FOR THE
CLANDESTINE SERVICES

General

A. The United States in the next five years and the following decade faces the need for a vast increase in information vital to its security. Clandestine collection by agents must obtain what SIGINT, overhead reconnaissance and overt human resources fail to learn in this period. Overhead reconnaissance supported by accelerated scientific development is seeking significant breakthroughs to be applied to intelligence needs and probably will achieve some of these. SIGINT, striving for breakthroughs, is struggling against the growing security barriers that increasingly prevent readout of wanted information from signals. We rely on the Clandestine Services operation--on the agent--to obtain the information in men's minds that reflects the shaping of the plans and intentions of another nation. The collection of such information is essential as another nation prepares the policies that may be against U. S. interests, as it develops the plans to carry out

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policy, and as it moves toward action against the U. S. - and therefore has a most essential relationship to early warning.

B. The Directorate of Plans is the National Clandestine Intelligence and Covert Action Service established by the National Security Act of 1947 and given subsequent specific direction by the National Security Council and Executive Action. As such, the Directorate has responsibility for the conduct of espionage and counter-intelligence activities abroad and for political, psychological, and paramilitary activities in support of U. S. policy.

C. The world is undergoing profound political changes, and U.S. national interests will face greater challenges in both the long and short term, for which the Directorate must plan. Specifically, there must be clandestine capabilities to accomplish more against the priority Soviet and Chinese Communist targets and at the same time to react to dramatic changes in the less developed countries on their periphery in Southeast Asia, and the Near East, and in Africa and Latin America.

D. Planning for clandestine activities must also take into account mounting political uncertainties in Western Europe evolving from the assertiveness of General deGaulle, the inevitable transfers of power following the deaths of Franco and Salazar, the continuing instability of the Italian political situation, and the potential for

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serious imbalances around the Mediterranean and in the Near East. Along with all these, in both the short and long term, we recognize national policymakers must be served with a constant flow of clandestinely obtained information about capabilities, plans and intentions of political enemies of the U. S., as well as of troublesome neutrals, and such information concerning other areas throughout the world about which policymakers must be currently informed. Within the above framework the Clandestine Service must prepare itself to be ready for contingency action in suddenly critical areas.

E. The Directorate of Plans, by legislation and Executive direction is the primary espionage, counterintelligence and covert action arm of the U. S. abroad. In order to carry out its responsibilities, it has established a functional concentration on those responsibilities in senior staffs and in area divisions. Espionage, the generic term, under which clandestine activity is conducted, is a basic responsibility.

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G. An equally important part of espionage is clandestine counterintelligence (CI), through which we learn about the aims, plans, modus operandi, and activities of the intelligence organizations of other countries. CI manipulates persons and organizations in countering espionage and counterintelligence actions directed against the United States.

H. Covert action, likewise an established basic responsibility of the Directorate of Plans, is, when diplomacy fails, the only means short of conventional armed conflict by which the U. S. can contain communism and its influence on the unstable, underdeveloped countries. It encompasses various forms of political action as well as paramilitary action.

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Many fundamental

problems must be examined if we are to cope with the challenges facing the Clandestine Services in the next decade. Several fundamental considerations are highlighted below:

DISCUSSION

I. Operations

A. Our responsibility for the conduct of espionage and counterintelligence is best expressed simply: The Clandestine Services must, through agent operations, penetrate the policy cognizant elements of our principal adversaries for purposes of determining intentions; it must concurrently use similar penetrations, at the highest level of decision making, as well as in opposition security services, to protect our penetrations, to determine their bona fides, and to know the activities of the opposition intelligence service against us. Herein is the integrated concept of classical clandestine intelligence collection and counterintelligence operation.

B. To enable increased agent operations directed against significant penetrations, there must be an increase in operational research to develop more detailed information in depth about targets, especially Soviet and Chinese. Operational research in the sense used here means a study in depth and detail of individuals and of


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environmental factors and must be carried on by officers trained and experienced in operations to determine the potentially successful approach, including susceptibilities of the individual. It means

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
Research on terrain,

demographic, economic, and basic scientific information will be drawn on when and if available from other organizations.

C. CIA's covert action assets, both political and para-military, will, in many developing areas of the world, become the primary means, and at time the only means, through which the U. S. Government will securely and in ways not directly attributable to it, be able to blunt the Communist offensive. It appears certain that during the late 1960's and on into the next decade the Soviets and Chinese Communists will intensify their subversive efforts throughout the world, but with principal emphasis on the developing areas of the Far East, Africa, and Latin America. They will competitively seek to strengthen the Communist Parties and to expand or develop the spectrum of political action mechanisms through which the parties operate. We anticipate, therefore, a steadily increasing need to employ CIA covert action mechanisms now in existence and a steadily, often sharply, rising demand for creation of better

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methods to meet communist challenges, which are gradually becoming more sophisticated and therefore more difficult to counter. Inherent in this is the need for more intensive training of a type that will draw on and articulate our wide experience and for research necessary to develop new and more effective techniques.

D. Paramilitary requirements, alone, will place a heavy premium on personnel qualified for [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] operations and may, as rapidly developing critical situations impinge on resources in being, sharply escalate our need to expand them in certain areas. Predisposition of assets - human and hardware - is only a partial answer to preparedness in this sphere of contingency operations. In the expanding framework of our civic action programs in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, capable people must be available to exploit the lessons learned in Laos and Vietnam. It is clear that a larger cadre of talented and resourceful people will be required to manage the expanded and more flexible covert action instrumentalities which will be needed in the period ahead.

E. The combined covert political action and paramilitary resources and assets of the Directorate of Plans enables CIA to carry out its responsibilities, [REDACTED] to the overall counterinsurgency program of the United States.

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II. Cover

A. Agent and operational cover is essential to the accomplishment of the clandestine mission. In essence, cover is the provision of the appearance for an officer or agent to be in a position required for access to the target persons and places necessary for the acquisition of information, and for functioning in all necessary covert action aspects.


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C. Deficiencies in the concept and in the modalities of cover have long been recognized by the Clandestine Services and serious efforts have been made over the years to remedy them.


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III. Clandestine Services Manpower Needs

A. The staff manpower capabilities of the Clandestine Services are now at a point where additional crisis demands might well find us without the necessary resiliency to react. A variety of



temporary remedies are being initiated by the Clandestine Services to cope with this problem, but it is clear, that whereas they may ameliorate it for a time, there is need for the development of a concept which, for want of a better description might be called "strength in depth." This concept encompasses the following:

1. An increase in Clandestine Services ceilings of to extend over the next five years. Recruits to fill these positions would receive full clandestine training with emphasis on critical language training. The larger number would be acquired in the early part of the five year period. These officers would also constitute a contingency development cadre with the clear understanding that they would be used in Headquarters and field assignments and also earmarked for use in critical areas on short notice.

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B. Study of the implications of the Clandestine Services personnel "hump" supplies another very important reason for recruiting a "development cadre." Losses of Clandestine Services personnel during a five year period beginning about 1970 may reach serious proportions as a result of early retirement and other attrition. A heavier

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than usual infusion of new blood during the coming five years would tend to offset these losses, provide the manpower in depth that is needed to react to the crisis situations facing us in the late 1960's, and avoid the debilitating strains on complements carrying out other ongoing assigned responsibilities.

C. An additional will also be needed over the next five years to do the already mentioned operational research that our currently over-extended complement of operations officers have neither the time nor opportunity to do.

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IV. Training

A. During the projected period career trainees destined for duty with the Clandestine Services must receive more intensive and longer periods of training, interspersed with desk indoctrination, than is now possible. As the Clandestine Services increases its annual requirement for career trainees in order to replace those officers lost by death, retirement, or resignation, increased training facilities in Office of Training and increased workload on the training elements within the Clandestine Services will be necessary. The above cannot be taken out of cadres currently committed to operations with present manpower levels.

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B. It is essential that officers destined for truly clandestine careers be trained separately from other trainees who are not destined for such sensitive activities. This is feasible through adjustments of present training practices, but these must be adjusted.

V. DD/P Planning

A. Planning requirements and problems confronting the Clandestine Services are becoming increasingly numerous and complex, both in terms of internal CIA planning and programming and of meshing CIA planning with that of other United States agencies. DD/P capabilities for planning to deal with future contingency situations anywhere in the world need improvement. There is a need to enhance our capability for (a) the development of contingency planning of resource requirements for selected areas likely to require intensive DD/P involvement, and (b) a continuing and probing analysis of DD/P programs to make them more responsive to contingency situations. As a consequence of this problem, we are reordering certain existing units and personnel into a centrally organized planning element. This strengthening of a DD/P centralized approach is essential to the support of planning in all area divisions.

B. It is fully realized that to date ad hoc contingency planning, usually concomitant with a crisis, has been done by the

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area divisions with varying degrees of success. Much of the stress associated with this can be eliminated at the area division level where resources have been over-taxed. The late 1960's give promise of further contingency crises which we must be prepared to meet.

VI. Management - Personnel

A. Transfer of the Clandestine Services Personnel Division from the DD/S to the Clandestine Services will enable the DD/P to possess the essential tool to help him carry out his management responsibility with the maximum flexibility so necessary to his unique mission. Early retirement and an out-placement mechanism will be outgrowths of the impact of the new CIA Retirement System on this Directorate, and emphasizes the need for the relocation of the Clandestine Services Personnel Division. At the same time, DD/P will remain fully responsive to the Director's needs for information and review of the DD/P personnel management activities.

VII. Summary and Conclusions

A. It is clear that an urgent need exists for a carefully ordered increase in all phases of this Directorate's work. This judgment is based on the reasonable and prudent interpretation of the broad assumptions underlying the overall DD/P Long Range

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Plan, as well as the specific area by area assumptions spelled out by the area divisions of this Directorate.

B. We must bend every effort to sharpen the disciplines and dynamically improve the professional quality of Clandestine Services in order to effect agent penetrations of hostile regimes, particularly the Soviet Union and Communist China. We must, at the same time, spare no effort to penetrate hostile regimes to establish the bona fides of our agent penetrations and to protect them from compromise.

C. Because the U. S. must be prepared to negate Communist and other disruptive influences around the world, particularly in areas where conventional diplomatic and related pressures are not feasible, another important Directorate responsibility, i. e., that for conducting covert action operations, must be effectively exercised. Covert Action will in the years ahead represent in many of the developing countries the only means, short of conventional armed conflict, by which the U. S. may protect its interests.

D. The Clandestine Services has a unique and critical role to play and must be allowed to function within CIA with that degree of

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isolation necessary to insure that the U. S. has a truly clandestine service. At the same time, this Directorate recognizes that it must remain fully responsive to the Director's needs for information about its objectives, its capabilities, and its accomplishments so that he may better judge its effectiveness and thus be in a better position to exercise overall management of it.

E. The Clandestine Services projections for manpower and funds, within this Long Range Plan, are, perhaps, conservative in the light of inevitable increases in Clandestine Services responsibilities in the coming years. We point out, however, in this regard that the one basic resource most essential to the Clandestine Services is people - not just numbers of people - but people with unusual and often unique personal qualities, education, experience, and outlook who can live and operate effectively in an atmosphere of espionage as agents and as managers of agent operations and under circumstances which severely test their inner resources. It takes time to find and select them. Furthermore, it requires from three to five years to develop in school situations and in on-the-job training here and abroad the unique disciplines that people will need as Clandestine Services professionals. In short, the "bank account" of the Clandestine Services is time and people.

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F. In its Long Range Plan, this Directorate has identified three kinds of manpower needs during the next five years:

1. Those increases during the five year period required to meet a normal and very gradual expansion of the complement and to take into account normal attrition; the total increment in this category is approximately or about per year.

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2. It has also projected a requirement for an increase of to be considered as a contingency development cadre to be exposed to all essential Clandestine Services disciplines and to be integrated into regular Clandestine Services assignments and yet to be available for deployment quickly to critical areas such as Vietnam

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25X1A 3. It has projected a requirement for a third category of people representing an increase of These are the officers devoted to what was earlier defined as clandestine operations research. These must also be operationally trained

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but will be assigned principally to intensified research in support of penetrations operations mounted against the Soviet Union and Communist China and to a lesser extent against other important targets.

G. The above projections, particularly those in (2) and (3) represent a conscious and critically important effort to fill the gaps in our complement caused by the lack of enough personnel experienced in operations and in the disciplines of clandestinity to do the research that must now be done if we are to conduct the sustained, demanding, highly sophisticated penetration operations against hostile regimes that will yield national plans and intentions.

H. Because of ceiling limitations imposed during the past few years, the "front line" of the DD/P has grown too thin; the little strength in depth that it possesses has been dissipated in the interests of meeting immediate operational needs. This loss must be recouped if we are to enjoy any resiliency in contingencies and if we are to progress in the all-important penetration operations against our adversaries.

I. It is essential for the DD/P to retain control of the

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dissemination of its agent-collected information if it is to protect its agent from compromise. It must also retain such operational support mechanisms as [] and related machine processing and the technical support function of the Technical Services Division which are peculiarly related by reason of need and security to the Clandestine Services. Separate though these remain, they will be related to the degree necessary to whatever centralization is helpful to the office of the DCI. Likewise there will be the appropriate, secure relationship with the other Directorate to enable the DD/P to obtain pertinent assistance.

J. The foregoing is an overview of the Directorate of Plans. The specific plans by functions and geographic areas, for the next five years and the general on-going view of the next decade, are detailed in the bound volume of the DD/P Long Range Plan.

VIII. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

A. In order to fulfill its unique and critical role, the Clandestine Services function within CIA with that degree of isolation necessary to insure that the U. S. has a truly clandestine and covert action service. At the same time it must remain responsive to the

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Director's needs for information about its objectives, programs, needs, and accomplishments.

B. The Clandestine Services concentrate on operations to accomplish agent penetrations for acquisition of information related as closely as possible to plans and intentions of hostile regimes.

C. Officers who are destined for truly clandestine careers should, in necessary instances, be trained separately from other trainees who are not to follow a career of sensitive activity.



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E. Clandestine Services manpower be increased in three categories: (1) ongoing necessary normal expansion, (2) a contingency development cadre for use on short notice in critical areas, (3) clandestine operational research.

F. The Clandestine Services Personnel Division be transferred from the DD/S to the DD/P, to enable him to possess and direct

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the essential tool for fulfilling his management role with the
maximum flexibility so necessary to his unique mission.

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PART III - SECTION B

PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL

I. Objectives

The major objectives in CIA's long range plan for the production of intelligence are:

A. To strengthen the capability for assuring 24-hour current and net tactical intelligence;

B. To strengthen the strategic base of research in support of estimates - economic, economic-military, and scientific-technical - and to complete the base by extending it in political research.

These objectives must be realized concurrently.

II. Factors Bearing on Production

A. Research and analysis against Communist China must be more than doubled during the next five years, without relaxing effort against the USSR. By request of the Secretary of Defense the Agency's work in military costing must be expanded to include all Communist military establishments, especially the Chinese. It should

be noted that the sharp increase against Communist China

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B. At the same time, care is necessary to prevent a weakening of capability directed to the instability and disorder which threaten from the underdeveloped countries and regions of the world.

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D. The intelligence required during the period of this plan will be more and more national in character, whether it pertains to localized political turbulence in a less developed or newly emerging nation; to the conflicting interests of great powers in local nationalisms, racism, or populism in the inciting crossfires of revolutionary social and political movements; to the potential for confrontation with Communist China and the USSR; or to Olympian competitions between the U. S. , the USSR, and possibly others such as China.

III. Manpower Estimates



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IV. Discussion

A. Twenty-four Hour Current Intelligence.

From the time of the Korean War, when the Agency operated on a shoe string, sending one or two analysts to the Pentagon each morning to summarize the daily telecon for the President, to the present war in Vietnam, there have been many alarms and crises of widely differing kinds. The Agency knows from experience that it must stay ahead of the changing tempos in the development and progression of enduring crises, and that it must not let new crises and untoward events take our Government by surprise. In serving the President it serves the entire foreign operations of the Government. The degree of

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the President's involvement in the direction of foreign operations has varied with time, style, and situation. But over the years a rising premium has attached to fast and accurate current intelligence. The current intelligence front has increased in importance, with corresponding demands upon the CIA Watch system.

B. Operations Center and Current Intelligence Strength

For the duration of this plan the goal is maximum preparedness for simultaneous crises of all kinds, from obscure and multifacious developments in the revolutionary world of the backward, to the actions and reactions of the Communist powers, both in their internal and external policies and their relations to new and old opportunities and contests. The perfecting of means for alert involves not only the ability to concentrate resources for quick response, but also advanced readiness with the strength and quality of analysis required.

1. The Operations Center


It is an immediate objective to press on to a proper locus in which to concentrate analytical forces on critical situations, one equipped with the best in supporting services and communications, especially served by Clandestine Service reporting

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with proper protection by the DDP of its operations and sources. The Operations Center must be a nerve center in fact as well as in name.


2. Current Intelligence Strength

At the same time there is the objective of strengthening the analytical roster



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 This plan will and should be subjected to continuous review and reassessment. As now seen the increase should provide the measure needed to sustain task forces and analytical support of the Operations Center.

3. This planned increase, however, will not man a watch bill such as would be required in general war. To plan now for a full watch bill of analysts would multiply the projected increase by a factor of four. This would mean to plan now for a war-time scale of operations by 1970, without regard to the ambivalence of our position in external affairs. It does not seem advisable to take this full step in planning at this time, although with

the possibility clearly in mind, the measurement of on-duty and planned strength against the degrees of war should be a continuing task of a permanent planning group.

4. The expansion of current intelligence should not take place at the expense of or as a surrogate for the completion and the manning of the Agency's strategic base in research.

C. Strategic Base in Research. The next major concern, then, is the strategic base in research. It is not second in time or priority. Research here means research in support of estimates. It seeks painstakingly for the most reliable answers which all of the information will yield to the critical questions of major import to our national security. While the emphasis falls on support of estimates of hostile capabilities and intentions, the research is directly pertinent to the evaluations needed in current intelligence. Without anchorage in the depth of conclusions from relevant research, current intelligence is always in danger of drifting with a tide, imperceptible from one day to the next in the preoccupation with the immediate and the immediately following. Furthermore, the kind of research which constitutes the strategic base must be done within the Government by

specialists in their several fields who bring to the peculiarities and sensitivities of classified information a knowledge not only equal to that of their colleagues outside of Government but already shaped by experience to the practical questions which confront the Administration in its decisions of foreign policy.

1. There is an old controversy in the intelligence community over CIA's role in research. It stemmed from the question of jurisdictional responsibility and authority for estimates. This in turn reflected the thesis that each department preempted the responsibility for research in the field of its own operational authority. In research lay the authority of superior knowledge. Departmental authority for estimates in the field of departmental operations and departmental jurisdiction in research combined against CIA's earliest efforts to do national intelligence.

2. Following the reorganization of 1950-51, CIA was chartered to do research in economic intelligence on the Bloc only, and the charter came as much by default of State as by CIA's insistence on

research in an area which was then unknown territory. Research in the Soviet economy had to turn its back on requests for current intelligence in order first to establish base lines and norms. In time, the CIA became authoritative in the field of Soviet economic capabilities and performance.

3. From this base, by force of circumstance- the Director's need in support of the Department of Defense and the President - the Agency moved into military economics, military costing of the Soviet military establishment, research and development, production of advanced weapons, and the allocation of resources.

4. It is planned to strengthen this base to meet the requirement of the Secretary of Defense for military costing of the Chinese and satellite military establishments. An increase is necessary in any case to meet the menace of China - and the anticipated increase in volume of information on Chinese military capabilities, in research and development as well as in production and allocation.

5. In political research the problem is to strengthen the small existing base and build from it to the end of a diagnostic grasp and improved capability for prognosis in the many problems of Communist political capabilities and intentions as they relate to the practical dilemmas of their domestic and foreign policies. The Agency has secured a small base of research in special problems of political intelligence: Sino-Soviet relations, Communist doctrine and practice, Chinese policy and leadership. The international base of political research should extend beyond Sino-Soviet relations into the evolving relations of the powers, both Communist and non-Communist,

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6. In terms of dollars and positions relative to other efforts this expansion is not costly. But it will be well to make haste slowly and therefore surely. The analysts who can do the kind of work required must be masters, not journeymen apprentices, and they are hard to find - or hard to spare from other pressing duties.

7. As a unique subcategory, research in support of clandestine operational needs requires emphasis and recognition. It is necessary to bring a variety of specialists together for this effort. Long experience and experimentation point to the conclusion that this kind of support to the Clandestine Services must be carried out in and by, or under the auspices of the Directorate of Plans because of the considerations of security and the requirement for detailed knowledge of operations. This is treated especially in Part III - Section A.

D. Balance of Programs. The review of initial projections for the Agency's long range plan raises a fundamental question about long range trends in the distribution of positions and funds. In particular, the investment in the corps of analysts seems to diminish relative to that in technical research and development, collection, processing, and support. The identification and investigation of imbalances in our system should be an important part of the work of the permanent planning group.

E. Organization for Production. The present organization is not necessarily the best because it has grown the way it has.

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It is obviously essential to have functional as well as regional specialists and a strong group of generalists. But there is always the question of the most effective way in which to relate these groups in order to keep flexibility without loss of organizational discipline. There is no unchanging answer to the practical question of the right organization, as between geographic and functional, for example. Response to need by task forces will always be one of our organizational answers, because no rigid alignment will anticipate the overlapping complexities of substantive problems as they change in their particular formulations with events.

F. The question of organization is a vital Agency concern. It should be on the agenda of the permanent planning group. In preparation, it is recommended that the directorates review their organization in being or projected for production, and in collaboration with the permanent planning group submit their review and recommendations to the Director. The review should not be done in haste. It should presuppose the findings of study groups assigned by directorates to review our major substantive problems.

V. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

A. Long range objectives for the production of intelligence be approved:

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1. To strengthen the Agency capability for 24-hour current intelligence and the development of the Operations Center in connection therewith;
2. To strengthen the CIA strategic base in research and to extend it in political intelligence; and
3. To increase CIA's analytical strength against Communist China during the next five years in



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B. The Directorates review their organizations for the production of finished intelligence and, in collaboration with the permanent planning staff submit their recommendations for improvement.

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PART III - SECTION C

OVERT COLLECTION AND REFERENCE SERVICES

I. General

- A. The information services referred to herein are:

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the Central Reference Service, including the procurement and translation of foreign documents. Each service is established by charter as a service of common concern. (See Part III and Section B of Part IV.)

II. Objectives

The Agency's long range objectives are:

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3. to increase flexibility and readiness
for response to critical situations by development
of mobile resources.

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C. For the Central Reference Service

1. to complete as a matter of urgency
the conversion of document retrieval and the reference
service to an all source computer operation.
2. to apply the revolutionary advances
and the potential for the management of information
to the end of user controlled storage and retrieval.
3. to test the Automatic Language Processing
(ALP) system for machine-aided translations and steno-
type production, as part of the responsibility of the
Foreign Documents Division.

III. Discussion

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
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C. The Central Reference Service is already launched in a long range program of information management and is fully alert to the necessity for electronic automation and the integration of its service into the rapidly evolving means for satisfying the demands of the intelligence analyst faced with the oncoming flood of data.

IV. Estimated Costs

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PART III - SECTION D

SUPPORT


I. Objectives. The long range plan for Support has the following objectives:

A. Improved planning which will provide support properly attuned to the Agency's increasingly sophisticated and growing activities.


B. Redirection of the Agency's support programs in order to assure the flexibility and competence required by rapidly evolving technology, the continuing development of new major foreign problems, and the "information explosion."

II. Personnel Strength

A. The projections submitted by the Directorates for the next five years indicate sizeable increases in numbers of personnel.



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B. Increases in personnel strength are required, but the order of magnitude for the Agency as a whole cannot be determined without further study.

III. Medical Views on Planning and Human Resources

A. Agency's medical services direct attention to the increasing incidence of medical problems in Agency personnel and the corresponding need to conserve manpower. A broader application of increased diagnostic facilities and an educational program to insure managerial awareness is required.

B. Selection procedures and performance evaluations should be joined together in a system that contributes to better personnel management. The subject is under study. Therefore, it is intended to provide educational opportunities for management to gain increased understanding of human behavior.

IV. Senior Officer Training

A. The present CIA senior officer group is comprised of individuals of approximately the same age, many of whom will become eligible for retirement at the same time. The succeeding generation of executives will have insufficient chance to prepare themselves for executive responsibilities unless corrective measures are taken.

B. The Agency has made commendable progress in the training of young professionals and mid-careerists. We need now to take the next step--the inauguration of a Senior Officers' training course designed to prepare mid-careerists for the assumption of senior executive responsibilities. The creation of an Executive Career Service, including all senior Agency officials other than specialists, who possess executive qualifications of a flexible character, would appear to be a logical out-growth of this program. These individuals could be subject to rotational assignments throughout the Agency and across Directorate lines. An Executive Career Service could provide a source of talent trained in breadth. In time, such executives could be rotated to senior positions throughout the Intelligence Community as is the case on a limited scale today. This would tend to promote better understanding.

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V. Training Policies and Methods

A. The demand for scarce categories of skills in photo interpretation, science and technology, research, and automation has been and will continue to be in excess of the available supply from external sources. A considerable emphasis in the Agency's training efforts must be made if we are to cope with this problem.

Our long range efforts, then, should focus on the following:

1. The establishment of a training reserve so that the manpower to be trained can be spared from the mounting pressures of today's work requirements.
2. The selection and reassignment of more professionals from the Agency's senior ranks for the purpose of training and developing younger personnel.
3. Development of new methods of instruction (program learning) which will increase the training effort and at the same time provide for uniformly high quality.
4. Development of a greater language capability tailored to cover increased emphasis on

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China, Africa, and Latin America. The Agency must take steps now to develop a strong and meaningful language training policy if its capability in this field is to advance with the changing world situation.

VI. Development of Support Executives

A. Inherent in the Support Directorate long range program is the development to the highest degree of management expertise in all fields of support activity. The program already underway contemplates a development cadre of young support professionals who will be trained in all of the support functional fields, both domestically and overseas, over a long range period. This effort would be directed at official and nonofficial support requirements. From this group, support executives, capable of the broad-gauge judgment which will be required in years ahead, should emerge.

VII. Security

A. The Agency's long range security program will require greater emphasis in the technical security field and in the industrial security program in order to assure the protection of Agency interests.

B. Automatic data processing techniques are now being

developed to cope with the increasing volumes of security transactions and the increased cohesiveness of security relationships in the Intelligence Community. Elsewhere within our security structure modern technology in the fields of physical security, polygraphing, and technical security will upgrade our protective measures.

VIII. Communications. Planning for the Agency's future communications support includes:

- A. The increased use of automated equipment to expedite the flow of traffic and improve efficiency.
- B. An expanded technical capability to improve Agency posture in communications security and other technical fields.
- C. An increased number of base radio stations designed to ensure an increased Agency communications capability, including alternate facilities for dealing with crisis situations.
- D. Improved facilities for secure voice, data, and facsimile communications.
- E. Improved Agent communications gear offering greater security, flexibility, and speed.
- F. The increase in speed of Agency telecommunications is somewhat negated by the Agency's outmoded system of handling other forms of communications; i. e., dispatches, memoranda, and

messenger systems. In most cases the originator selects the means of transmitting the message. The proliferation of registries through which written communications wend their way negates the over-all goal of faster communications. A thorough-going systems analysis of Agency communications methods and practices is desirable.

IX. Recommendations

A. Recommendations pertinent to support are especially contained in Sections J, K, L, and M of Part IV. Recommendations in other sections will also affect the support base.

PART IV - SECTION A

THE CIA IMAGE

I. The Central Intelligence Agency has been concerned about its image to the world, and most particularly to the United States, ever since its creation. Overseas, the Agency image is important to the work of CIA operations. In fact, it may seriously affect the Agency's ability to work with the non-committed and underdeveloped countries. These are influenced to a considerable degree by what is said in the American press and also by the world press, which in turn can be affected by Communist propaganda and operations of the Disinformation Bureau of the Soviet intelligence service. Therefore, in planning for the future, the image of CIA plays an important role.

II. From a point of view of an organization containing a clandestine service, it would be ideal if the name or the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency were never mentioned in the public media. This, however, is impractical, particularly in a free society with freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to know what their Government is doing. Therefore, the development of the image of the Central Intelligence Agency must proceed on a practical basis.

It may take many years before it even approximates what would be considered a satisfactory image in a free society. It will take effort on the part of the Agency, and this effort cannot be allocated or assigned to any one unit but must be shared by all senior officers from the Director down.

III. Relations with the press or representatives of the public media is only one aspect of developing a correct image, although an important one. The Agency has learned by sad experience that if information concerning its work is available, publicity is inevitable. It would be a mistake if the Agency tried to fight this as the results in the past have always indicated that the effort is counterproductive.

IV. Perhaps even more important in developing the public image are the Agency's relations with the rest of the United States Government. This obviously includes the Executive Branch of the Government, and especially the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Security Advisor to the President, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, members of the Cabinet, and chiefs of independent agencies with which CIA has dealings. We believe that the Agency should have a concerted and carefully worked out briefing schedule for these officials which should be designed to educate them as to both the capabilities and limitations of the Agency and as to the utility of intelligence. This has never been done in the past, and the Agency has suffered for it.

V. Intelligence is only as good as the use which is made of it; and, if the policymakers are not aware of the value of intelligence or how to use it, the country will suffer. While it is hard to generalize in this area, it can be said that policymakers' reaction to intelligence will range all the way from those who ignore it completely to those who use it effectively. The objective should be the development of a system wherein the policymaker will know when to use intelligence and be aware of the assistance which it can give him in his job. The goal should be a system in which the President and his principal advisors periodically receive directly from the Director of Central Intelligence--and nobody else--briefings on the world situation and on the critical areas of the moment. If this could be arranged on a regular basis, the entire process of Government in the field of American security affairs would prosper. This is a process of education to achieve this objective, but it should be one of the major objectives of the Agency for the future.

VI. Second only to the President and the principal policymakers of the Executive Branch is the importance of a good CIA image with the United States Congress. While it is probably true that CIA has as good a reputation with the Congress today as any Government department or agency, we believe it could still be better, and that it should not rely exclusively on the efforts of the Director. There should be added

emphasis on briefing members of both the House and the Senate at a "secret" level on Agency activities, and we should take advantage of the very large number of the members of the Congress who are personal friends of Agency officials. It should be an objective to have most of the Senate and a good proportion of the House better acquainted with the Agency and with the intelligence process.

VII. Another very important area for the development of the Agency image is the academic world, for it is primarily in this field that we recruit the bulk of the career trainees of the Agency and seek assistance in research. The 100 Universities Program over recent years has made considerable progress in developing a better understanding in the academic world of the Central Intelligence Agency, and we believe this can be expanded and improved and would urge concentrated and systematic efforts in this regard.


VIII. Finally, there is the business world in which the Agency's image is important, and we have the mandate of the President to brief businessmen both on the work of the Agency and on areas abroad of interest to their organizations. This program has progressed but is still on a very modest scale and should be expanded.

IX. The Central Intelligence Agency should not overlook the fact that it has considerable interface with the American public which affects its

image

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The recruiters of the Office of Personnel and the investigators in the Office of Security (both DD/S) have likewise left favorable impressions in their activities, and the same is true of Agency personnel dealing with contractors. In all instances, however, these people need more and more prompt guidance from Headquarters at times when the Agency is in the headlines such as the Bay of Pigs, the U-2 incident, etc. Constructive, intelligent comment to a confidential contact is often better than silence which is often interpreted as admission. Finally, Agency personnel are often known as such in the communities where they live. When these people are public spirited, participate in community affairs, and are generally regarded as good citizens, the Agency benefits.

X. The CIA has already acquired a formidable body of alumni who are active in the business and academic worlds. Several times the Agency has studied making use of these people to assist it. Each time the formidable security problems associated with a formal alumni association have resulted in no action. Only with the creation of the outside board of the Educational Aid Fund has specific action been taken to utilize the potential

of alumni. Use should be made of hundreds of other prominent alumni by periodic confidential briefings and indications that the Agency is still interested in them.

XI. If all of the above activities are undertaken, and it is recommended that they be undertaken, the image of the Agency will steadily improve and it is demonstrable that, with the passage of time, it will become a widely known and accepted organization to the American public, and even to the world.

XII. Recommendations. It is recommended that:

- A. The Agency intensify its briefings on its organization, objectives, and mission to appropriate members of the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government;
- B. A systematic program be instituted for developing better understanding of the Agency in the academic and business world;
- C. A program for better use of Agency alumni be developed.

PART IV - SECTION B

CIA'S ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION

I. Introduction

A. Under the terms of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for recommending to the National Security Council "the coordination of such intelligence activities of the Government as relate to national security" and "to perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."

B. The Central Intelligence Agency has numerous assigned responsibilities for coordination. These coordinating responsibilities are almost all explicitly defined either in National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID), Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID) (as more definitive expansions of the former), or instructions from higher authority. In some cases they stem from agreements not contained in such documents.

II. Coordination of Intelligence Production

A. National Intelligence Estimates. Authority for the production of National Intelligence Estimates is referred to in NSCID 1 and NSCID 3 and specifically outlined in DCID 1/1. The Deputy Director for Intelligence through the Office of National Estimates (ONE) provides all services in support of the production of NIEs. The Assistant Director, Office of National Estimates, is Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (BNE). ONE provides a staff of analysts which prepare and coordinate with USIB agencies all terms of reference for proposed NIEs and review, synthesize, and write final draft estimates for presentation to the BNE. The Agency also provides all printing, binding, and distribution services connected with the production of NIEs.

B. Current Intelligence. The basic authority for CIA's role in current intelligence activities stems from para 2b of NSCID 3. Beginning in the late 1950's, the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), pursuant to an IAC (later USIB) decision, initiated a procedure whereby each daily publication of the Central Intelligence Bulletin was coordinated by an IAC panel. The need for this procedure was confirmed in CIA-DIA discussions of 1964 and

was continued as a coordination mechanism for the Central Intelligence Bulletin. OCI provides all services required for the production of coordinated current intelligence which includes a large analytical group, an Operations Center, and all necessary graphic art, reproduction, registry, and distribution facilities. This is a 24-hour, 7-day a week coordination job. It is desirable that the assignment for this coordination be officially specified in a DCID.

C. Scientific and Technical Intelligence. In addition to the responsibility stemming from NSCID 3 and DCIDs 3/3 and 3/4 for the production of scientific and technical intelligence, the CIA's coordinating role principally stems from the Chairman of USIB's appointment of CIA officers as the Chairmen of the Board's committees on atomic energy, guided missiles, and scientific intelligence. The Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee of USIB carries a specific responsibility for the disclosure and control of initial information regarding foreign nuclear explosions, an action which he normally takes after consultation with the Board's committee on atomic energy. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology provides services in support of these three committees and all support services concerned with producing national

scientific and technical intelligence.

D. Economic Intelligence. The Office of Research and Reports (ORR), DD/I, produces economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc pursuant to NSCID 3 and DCID 3/1. The Assistant Director, ORR, is Chairman of USIB's Economic Intelligence Committee which coordinates community economic intelligence programs related to DCID 3/1. Additionally, ORR produces essential military-economic intelligence in support of National Estimates and to meet intelligence needs of the Defense Department. ORR provides the co-chairman of the CIA/DIA Soviet Ground Forces Panel. 25X1B

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E. Basic Intelligence. The Agency has a major responsibility in the coordination of basic intelligence activities through the National Intelligence Survey program specified in NSCID 3. The Office of Basic Intelligence (OBI), DD/I, coordinates the scheduling, review, editing, production, and distribution of the NIS program for the Intelligence Community.

III. Coordination of Clandestine Services and Functions

A. NSCID 5 establishes on the DCI the responsibility for coordination of those clandestine activities of the armed services in the interest of their departmental missions. The DD/P in general is responsible through the station chiefs in the field and through the Foreign Intelligence Staff (FI) in headquarters for carrying out this responsibility in Washington. The coordination of clandestine collection responsibilities in the Department of Defense has devolved on the Defense Intelligence Agency, with the participation of the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army in direct relationship with the Foreign Intelligence Staff of the DD/P.

B. The FI Staff is also responsible for such coordination of clandestine intelligence activities abroad as is necessary with the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.

C. By direction of USIB, the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC), made up of representatives of the intelligence community, establishes priorities for the CIA Clandestine Services. Chief of the FI Staff, DD/P, is the chairman.

D. The Covert Action Staff (CA) of the DD/P is

responsible for coordination of all matters growing out of NSCID 5412 with the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. All DD/P area division chiefs are responsible for coordination of covert political activities with the various Assistant Secretaries of State for their pertinent areas.

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
H. It should be held in mind that coordination with the White House Staff, the 303 Committee and the Special Group-Counter Insurgency, as well as with certain other concerned

departments at responsible levels is carried on at multiple points throughout the Agency.

IV. Coordination of Overt Collection Activities

A. In carrying out its responsibility for a selective exploitation with the United States non-Governmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence under NSCID 2, the Agency is responsible for providing coordination as necessary

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V. Reference Services

A. The Office of Central Reference (OCR), DD/I, carries out several services in pursuance of directives. Under NSCID 1, OCR provides reference facilities of common concern as appropriate. Under DCID 1/9, OCR maintains a central file and reference service for the community on biographic data relating to foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, social, and cultural personalities. Under NSCID 2, OCR provides for the central procurement and exploitation of foreign language publications. Formal coordination of the above activities is accomplished through the USIB Committee on Documentation (CODIB), which is chaired by CIA. These central reference services are a major element of CIA's coordination responsibilities and involve the maintenance of large staffs to provide the required registering, coding, indexing, evaluation, report preparation, and distribution of materials to other intelligence agencies.

VI. Security

A. The Office of Security (OS), DD/S, has several coordinating responsibilities which derive from the National Security

Act of 1947, as amended, and in support of the Central Intelligence Agency. CIA provides the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee which was established pursuant to DCID 1/11. The Security Committee is responsible for recommending to USIB standards, practices, and procedures for intelligence security and security policy. The Committee also is responsible for damage assessments of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods and for coordinating with all USIB agencies and committees having related security responsibilities.

B. Office of Security provides advice and support to the National Reconnaissance Organization's security program and a range of supporting security services.

C. Office of Security also is responsible for servicing the requests of other Government agencies for information and services connected with personnel security clearances and for liaison and coordination with state and local police departments.

VII. Training

A. The Office of Training (OTR), DD/S, is not charged (in NSCIDs or DCIDs) with responsibilities for providing services of common concern or with coordinating the training programs of

other agencies. In fact, however, the Office of Training and other Agency elements frequently provide courses, instructors, and facilities for the training of personnel from USIB and other agencies. OTR also assists in the provision of materials, services, and advice to other Government intelligence agencies and often develops intelligence training programs applicable to several USIB agencies.

VIII. Communications

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IX. Other Specialized Coordination Services

A. Overhead Reconnaissance and Photo Interpretation

1. CIA provides the Chairman of the USIB Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR),

established under DCID 2/7, and an extensive central system for the control and referencing of all overhead reconnaissance targets required for support of COMOR's coordinating mission.

2. Under NSCID 8, CIA provides a National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) to provide preliminary interpretations of photographs to the community, to provide and disseminate photographic interpretation reports in support of the national intelligence effort, and to furnish additional related support to the community. The Agency through the NPIC consults with other intelligence agencies in the coordination of photographic interpretation requirements and priorities and provides all material support and services required to operate the NPIC.

B. The Watch Committee. Pursuant to DCID 1/5, the indications and warning responsibilities of the Director and the Board are coordinated through the Watch Committee of the Board chaired by a senior Agency official. The staff of the Watch Committee, known as the National Indications Center, is headed by a CIA

official.

C. Map Procurement. By virtue of agreements informally reached, CIA coordinates the Government's efforts on map procurement through the interagency map procurement coordination committee which is under the chairmanship of the Agency.

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PART IV - SECTION C

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COLLECTION
OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

- I. A critical function in the intelligence process which has challenged CIA over the years has been the establishment and levying of requirements in a systematic and discriminating manner.
- II. It cannot be said that the problem is yet solved; it probably never will be. However, in the last fifteen years substantial progress has been made in solving this problem. Interestingly enough, the most fruitful attacks on the problem have been on requirements for those collection systems which are most expensive, most hazardous (and therefore sensitive), and most productive. These are in the fields of clandestine collection, SIGINT collection, and collection by overhead reconnaissance.
- III. In each of these cases there has been an increased concentration of effort and discrimination to insure that the requirements levied on them are susceptible of collection by the best means with a minimum of duplication. History shows that the systems have been highly

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complementary in their productivity, which has forced an examination of all sources in determining specific requirements.

IV. The foregoing has had its effect upon the requirements levied on other collection methods. Thus the emergence of the U-2 provoked a redirection of the effort of the Clandestine Services, and the requirements to be levied on them since many requirements could be much more promptly and completely met by photography.

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V. Of great importance is the effort of the Board to focus on critical collection problems through one of its committees. The purpose has been to define sharply what assets can be usefully energized to close significant intelligence gaps on pressing intelligence estimates and problems.

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VI. Coordination has greatly improved in insuring that the Agency's needs are given proper attention in the community's determination of requirements for major collection systems. The Collection Guidance Staff, attached to the office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, has provided a useful focus in this regard.

VII. The maintenance of strong requirements mechanisms of the USIB for requirements is essential. The application of cost-effectiveness techniques and systems evaluation will impinge upon the requirements process. They will cause increasing discrimination in the definition of requirements for collection. They will also have great impact upon the selection of new collection devices within the three major systems-- human resources, SIGINT, and overhead reconnaissance.

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PART IV - SECTION D

EARLY WARNING OF STRATEGIC ATTACK
(INTERCONTINENTAL WARFARE)

I. Introduction

A. The warning problems of the next decade differ from those of a decade ago. A devastating "continent-busting" attack is now attainable, preparation time for enemy forces is greatly shortened, the number and scale of necessary enemy preparations have diminished, and real surprise is now possible.

B. Warning information in the next decade will probably increase in volumes. Future advanced collection systems are likely to generate more information, perhaps on new and heretofore unreachable aspects of enemy preparation, but they are unlikely to be able to give concrete proof of hostile enemy intentions.

C. The task of providing early warning of strategic enemy attack has always been complicated by the lack of dependable, timely, direct information on enemy intentions. While there may be some improvement in determining intentions, warning for the period of this plan will continue to be based primarily upon observable enemy preparations for war.

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D. The production of warning intelligence requires, therefore, deep analytical familiarity with military doctrine, weapons systems, training patterns, combat proficiency, logistical levels, deployment rates, recuperation measures, active and passive defense requirements, and the broad status of the enemy's economic, scientific, political, and cultural life. These are dependent on the entire intelligence process.

E. "Indicators" describe the way we expect the enemy to pose himself for attack, and they constitute the highest priority requirements upon all the collection systems available to the intelligence community. The certainty with which warning can be given will depend upon the speed, sensitivity, and comprehensiveness of collection sources and on the precision of analytical recognition of deviations from norms represented by the collected and collated indications. Improvement in the warning process in the future will lie in:


1. More accurately described indicators,
2. More diversified and more sharply targeted collection,
3. The use of automated information processing and analysis systems,

4. Deeper knowledge through research on
enemy patterns of behavior, and

5. Intensive training in the recognition of
indications and their changing form and pattern.

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III.

A. Photographic


reconnaissance

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satellites provide, after COMINT, the best source of warning evidence. As resolutions improve, our ability to detect changes in the physical aspects of the enemy's terrain and forces will permit increasingly accurate assessments of the levels of readiness implied by enemy motion. This will be particularly so when ways are found to correlate COMINT and photography on an area or activity in virtual real-time. Developing cross-feed between these two main sources on enemy forces is one of the biggest challenges for warning intelligence.

B. Reconnaissance is uniquely useful in spotting movements of enemy forces, dispersals, concentrations, occupation of emergency facilities, changes in transportation facilities, and the assembly of wartime-only transport and equipment over large areas of the enemy's

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territory virtually simultaneously. Daily coverage of even a small sample of enemy submarine and air bases, nuclear storage sites, missile and SAM complexes, rail yards, harbors, camps, and helicopter parks will provide continuity, norms, and early recognition of abnormalities with a reliability the warning business has not had so far.

What remains to be done, however, is to compress the interval between the photographing or sensing of the ground image and the receipt and analysis of the images in the warning community.

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The exploitation of the volumes of information thus acquired stagger the imagination; only through the use of automated scanning and discrimination will it be at all possible to reduce this flow to manageable proportions. At that point radical revisions will be needed in the organic relationships between warning organizations and those involved in photo interpretation.

IV. Human Sources

A. Advances in human source collection for warning purposes will be less dramatic and slower in coming. Clandestine sources are

uniquely capable in detecting changes in morale, in expectations among the troops and the populace, in tightening civil controls, and, by overt observers in enemy country, in increased readiness among civil and industrial populations. Improvement in this sort of collection lies in growth in operational professionalism, more precise requirements, and a more energetic and continuous dialogue between warning analysts and collectors, sharpening and making more current and relevant the things to watch for on the enemy's ground that would reflect readiness for or fear of war.

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VI. Modernizing Data Processing and Analysis

A. Improvements in warning sources must be accompanied by radical steps toward modernizing and augmenting the community's capabilities for exploiting and analyzing warning information. Present volumes of warning information outstrip all but the most superficial analysis efforts now. Ways must be found for a central warning analysis staff to use the complex and occasionally overlapping computer programs which are now on the point of activation in a number of intelligence organizations. At some time in the future, data-link transmissions and remote readout from these scattered ADP systems can be used to provide the broadest possible spectrum of information on the behavior of the enemy.

B. The staffs of the National Indications Center and of supporting sections in the community's current intelligence shops are concentrating on the current flow of information--essentially current military intelligence. More research is necessary into the enemy's behavior and war readiness to insure that indicators, or warning collection requirements, are up to date, accurately reflect current enemy practice, and represent activities truly required to bring the enemy to combat readiness.

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PART IV - SECTION E

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS

I. Discussion

A. There is an urgent need for greater employment of automatic data processing techniques in intelligence processing. Achievements in photographic reconnaissance, both in the quantity of photography acquired and in the resolution of the product, have created a crisis in image processing and analysis which must be met to the degree possible by automatic data processing.

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B. The allocation of additional personnel and additional money will no longer suffice. The highly skilled people required are not available in sufficient numbers to satisfy the needs of CIA alone, much less the anticipated needs of the intelligence community. The CIA can no longer afford the expense of employing brute force techniques for the resolution of problems which may be amenable to the application of advanced technology.

C. The examples we have cited above for the photographic and SIGINT fields are typical of what we have come to know as the "information explosion." The problems have been created by pre-occupation with collection programs. The "information explosion," in turn, has created an "analysis gap." The clearest evidence that such a gap may exist can be obtained from an examination of the Agency budget. We estimate that whereas approximately [REDACTED] will be 25X1A allocated to technical collection programs in FY 1966, only [REDACTED] 25X1A will be devoted to automatic data processing (ADP), which appears to be the most likely tool for solving some of the critical processing problems which we anticipate.

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D. Considerable effort by the Agency has been devoted to the study and analysis of computer applications within CIA. The use of computers in Agency accounting activities and specialized support applications [] collection systems engineering and operations, and photographic mensuration) have been going on for some time and plans exist for the implementation of advanced computer programs to intelligence processes. Nevertheless, the effective application of ADP to the intelligence processes has not made sufficient progress due to some misconceptions. It is not true that to employ effectively automatic data processing techniques an analyst must be a computer programmer, or that a successful programmer must acquire significant analytical skills. It is not true that the effective utilization of ADP equipment will require organizational adjustment of a disruptive character. While it is advisable to have centralized control of technical knowledge in ADP programs, it is not necessary to centralize control over component computer systems. Yet these contentions and more appear to have rather wide currency. The man-machine relationship, as it will develop through the application of ADP programs to the intelligence process, will be its own best denial of the misconception and organizational anxieties arising from them can best be relieved by

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training and indoctrination of our personnel in the principles and applications of ADP.

E. The past five years of study, debate, and the limited application of ADP have effectively paved the way for a more aggressive application of ADP techniques to Agency programs. The program which has been described for the logical and progressive application of ADP is basically valid. However, the schedule should be accelerated and, unless the CIA undertakes to do so on its own initiative, a program may well be imposed upon us by external elements which will exacerbate those very problems which our conservatism has heretofore sought to minimize.

F. With regard to specific applications, the equipment and techniques now exist for the rapid application of ADP to many management tasks including budget, inventory control, personnel records (with due care for the security of DD/P personnel in all categories), contract data, etc. Planning for the application of machine processing to information filing and retrieval is well advanced and its implementation probably can be accelerated. These applications will develop into a capability for data manipulation and then evolve into true analytical programs from which relationships among various types of events and data through the application of correlation techniques can be

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derived. There will be a necessity for greater utilization of large data bases in analytical programs and for experimentation to develop new processes having direct application to the substantive intelligence activities of the Agency. Hopefully, predictive processes will evolve with time and experience.

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H. The application of machine processing techniques to Agency managerial, operational, and intelligence programs probably will develop a momentum which will tend to compress the schedules now envisioned. Such a program must be supported, however, by adequate research programs in intelligence processes, if the program is not to become prohibitively expensive because of false applications and false starts. We believe that, in addition to the investment in qualified personnel and equipment, provision should be made to fund and staff research programs of the following magnitude:

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Research Funding and
Manpower Requirements

FY'66 FY'67 FY'68 FY'69 FY'70

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Funds (\$ million)

Technical Staff

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II. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

A. The DCI direct each Deputy Director to assign two or three individuals to work full time on the ADP problem, and to review the application of ADP to his operations and processes as a matter of high priority, and to submit within 90 days a phased and costed program.

B. The CIA Planning Staff prepare within 120 days a phased and costed Agency program for ADP, based on Directorate submissions, for review by the Executive Director-Comptroller and approval by the DCI.

C. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology (DD/S&T) be directed by the DCI to implement the approved Agency ADP program as executive agent and to act as Chairman of an ADP executive coordination committee consisting of the Deputy Directors concerned. The committee should report to the DCI quarterly.

D. The DD/S&T establish and staff an intelligence sciences laboratory to study and apply on an experimental basis new techniques in ADP and analysis to Agency programs as a service of common concern.

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PART IV - SECTION F

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

I. Introduction

A. For the purposes of this paper, systems analysis is defined to include three elements:

1. A systematic investigation of the objectives to be achieved by a particular program including, for example, programs or systems involving new collection devices;

2. A comparison of the cost, effectiveness, and risks of alternative programs or systems for achieving these objectives, considering all aspects of the intelligence process related to the programs in question; and

3. The selection of an alternative which will permit the system as a whole (collection, processing, and analysis) to best approximate the achievements of the intelligence objectives with a minimal expenditure of resources.


II. Background

A. Over the past five to ten years the development of increasingly expensive and complex intelligence systems, involving many critical inter-relationships within the field of collection, information processing and intelligence production, has made systems analysis imperative for top level CIA management. New collection programs involving expensive vehicles and equipment as well as elaborate requirements for processing and analyzing masses of data make systems analysis most compelling both for CIA and for the intelligence community.

B. There is already a growing awareness of the need for employing this analytic method in the Agency. The DDCI and the Executive Director-Comptroller have recently authorized establishment of a systems analysis capability in the latter's office. Moreover, a number of components of the Agency have undertaken program analysis in varying degrees, although for the most part this has not been done with sufficient rigor and comprehensiveness.

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III. Problems Arising From the Absence of Systems Analysis

A. The Agency has already suffered from the absence of this kind of thorough-going program evaluation for overhead reconnaissance systems. Good judgment and intuition were applied to the development of the collection vehicles and to many of the arrangements for formulating priority requirements, for information processing and for final use in intelligence production. However, serious problems have arisen which were predictable and could have been substantially mitigated through some form of systems analysis at the outset. Such analysis would have

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included consideration of the role of other means of collection and the various trade-off possibilities; the problems of developing a processing capability which would keep pace with the volume of information collected; and, the need for an analytic capability able to effectively exploit this material. For example:

1. Other collection activities continued much too long, in some cases for reasons of security, to acquire some of the very same material which was being obtained more effectively by these reconnaissance vehicles.

2. The interpretation and analysis capability was at times inadequate to keep pace with the flow of film and tapes and, over a period of time, the backlog became intolerably large.

3. An analytical capability to exploit this material effectively for intelligence production was not adequately considered during the research and development phase of this program.

IV. Immediate Need for Systems Analysis

- A. Whatever the losses suffered by intelligence because of the failure to analyze systematically the entire spectrum of

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intelligence in relation to these programs they will be small in comparison with the waste and confusion which could occur if we fail to analyze properly--at the outset--the more expensive and complex systems that are already on the drawing boards or in more advanced stages of development. There will be numerous decisions during the R&D phases of development which will affect not only the program under consideration but many other related activities for collection, processing, and analysis as well.

B. Systems analysis of certain Agency programs is needed in part for the same reasons that have prompted its use in the Pentagon today, namely, for decisions related to the development of hardware programs. This would involve decisions as to what information is critical for intelligence, the alternatives for acquiring it, the kinds of equipment to be employed, the selection from among alternatives in terms of effectiveness, costs, time of delivery, etc. There are related decisions and considerations which will have a bearing on the functions we want the equipment to perform and the kind of equipment we select to perform it. As two examples:

1. An expensive new collection device may and probably will have several capabilities for acquiring different kinds of information. We must determine

which of these functions should be performed, to what extent, and in what combination. Answers to these questions should depend to a significant degree on the information which the offices responsible for intelligence production and intelligence operations believe would be of greatest importance and on the prospects we have for processing the information. This in turn hinges on read-out, collation, and indexing capability. These are dependent on processing equipment, ADP application, and the ability to obtain the funds and qualified personnel for all phases of the process. Decisions relating to the development of these capabilities must take into account the need for reasonable synchronization in the phasing and the possibility of trade-offs between all of these developments.

2. Decisions of this kind regarding new devices and new programs must take into account the relationship to and their impact on existing activities. For example, what is the relationship of a particular new collection device to programs of the clandestine

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services--programs which are also employing new sophisticated collection equipment? Are they unnecessarily duplicative or usefully supplementary? Are there trade-offs involved in the sense that the existence of one program may obviate or reduce the necessity for the other?

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C. The foregoing emphasizes that the need for systems analysis in CIA--and in the intelligence community as well--is now a matter of urgency. Many important decisions of the Agency regarding major programs--particularly programs centered on expensive new collection devices--could gain substantially in savings and effectiveness through the application of this analytic approach.

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D. Finally, it would not be the responsibility of a planning staff to perform the entire analysis functions. The principal job of the staff would be to make certain that such analysis is carried out. This would mean, of course, there should be members of the staff who are trained and experienced in systems analysis. The staff would provide the professional and technical guidance for the analysis and whatever support is required to ensure appropriate coordination with interested components of the Agency and their external research contractors.

V. Recommendations

A. That CIA employ systems analysis in the selection and evaluation of major intelligence programs.

B. That the responsibility for ensuring that systems analysis is applied to selected programs and for providing technical assistance and guidance be assigned to a planning staff. Further, it is recommended that this function be integrated with the responsibilities for planning, scheduling and monitoring selected programs as we gain experience with the application of this technique; and that these functions be administered in close consultation with the Office of Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower (BPAM) but separate from BPAM.

The functions of systems analysis would overlap and duplicate some functions currently being carried out by BPAM and the Inspector General. There should be a delineation of these functions at the time a planning staff is established.

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C. That several projects be selected for trial of systems analysis sometime within the next six months, including for example, In its present stage of development it would be particularly useful to analyze the requirements and the exploitation aspects of this Project. In undertaking this initial effort great care should be exercised to avoid overly detailed analysis requiring elaborate mathematical models. Moreover, since certain of these projects will have been under consideration for some time, this analysis should not be permitted to delay critical decisions. As we gain experience with this technique, our analysis can become more comprehensive and penetrating and perhaps more mathematical.

D. That a program be established for training selected CIA managerial personnel in systems analysis.

PART IV - SECTION G

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

I. Mission-Oriented Research

A. "Mission-oriented" means to carry out research efforts along functional lines to meet Agency needs, rather than by academic discipline. Research on the process of human perception of a visual image or auditory signal, although basic in nature, provides the building blocks for development of systems to support the National Photographic Interpretation Center, DD/P, and other groups and in this sense is mission oriented.

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II. In-House Research

A. The most difficult part of research is proper identification of the problem. Government, industry, and university research groups cannot provide us with the kind of assistance we need until we are prepared to study in depth the nature of our problems and assist in the translation of these problems into

technically feasible solutions. This will undoubtedly require some in-house research but should not imply the establishment of a number of laboratories or indeed any laboratories until it is abundantly clear that it is necessary and that it will be necessary for many years (See Part IV, Section E.)

III. External Research

A. The keystone of our research philosophy should be that we use the resources of other federal agencies, industries, and universities and that we "piggy-back" on their research to the greatest extent possible. To this end we have devoted a major part of our time for the purpose of establishing a network which connects us with national research and development. This includes access to Department of Defense, Defense Documentation Center, Scientific Information Exchange, National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, Atomic Energy Commission, and other government research programs. The products of this network include research, reports, and periodic meetings with key research and development personnel. The university research community is linked in primarily through personal contacts, and the various scientific advisory committees throughout the government. There are hundreds of leading scientists in the university environment who are in direct

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and often frequent contact with us. Expanded contacts with industrial research groups are at an early stage but are accelerating rapidly as industry becomes increasingly aware of the Agency's research and development mission. Security restrictions in some cases prevent us from disseminating requests for proposals in the usual sense, but we have asked industrial organizations to submit informal ideas to us for consideration and discussion before the submission of formal proposals. This has led to many fruitful discussions with industrial research groups without the necessity of their spending large sums of money for proposals which might not be of interest to this Agency. This is not to say that our contacts should not be broader nor is it to suggest that we have our fingers on all research under way in the United States. It should be pointed out, however, that a certain degree of discrimination is necessary as in other fields and that it is possible to select and maintain contact with key individuals in a given field who, in turn, can guide and direct us to the appropriate research activities in their general area of knowledge.

IV. Research Versus Development

A. This Agency, like Department of Defense,

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National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and others, tends to lump research and development together. In most cases the funds for development far outweigh those for research. There is a distinct danger that the pressures to produce quick solutions to complex problems lead to the impoverishment of research. It is often accompanied by a reluctance to terminate a development program (Russian proverb: "The better is the enemy of the good."). This Agency must establish and protect a small percentage of its budget for research which is not to be diverted to the day-to-day technical requirements.

B. At this time very little research is being supported by this Agency, probably well under 1 percent of the total operating budget of the Agency. Indeed the present budget breakdown by programs and projects does not distinguish between research and development currently under way in such organizations as the Office of Communications, Office of ELINT, Office of Research and Development, National Photographic Interpretation Center, and Technical Services Division of DD/P. The time has come when the Agency must focus attention in a more organized way on those key research problems necessary for the achievement of the Agency's objectives.

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V. Key Areas for Research

A. A few of the critical areas for research in behalf of the Agency's objectives have been identified. These include models and other methods for data analysis, studies of human perception and the man-machine interface, new methods for communication, new sensor emplacement techniques, and advanced concepts of "black box" systems with associated sensors.

VI. Control of Research

A. Research by its nature requires long term support and continuity and should be undertaken only in high priority areas where results are applicable to several components of the Agency. Research funds should be budgeted for and allocated centrally within the Agency to ensure that research programs are viable, coordinated, not competitive, and are responsive. Research funds should be allocated to those components best able to carry out the programs.

VII. Level of Research

A. Experience in private industry and government indicates that is a reasonable investment for research. The Agency's lack of

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experience or criteria necessary to determine the level of research dictates that our research program be re-examined frequently in the light of future needs as well as results of research undertaken by other government and private organizations.

VIII. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

- A. Budget submissions and records must identify funds allocated to research as distinct from development;
- B. Research funds be budgeted and allocated centrally; and
- C. The Agency should set aside percent of its operating budget for scientific research in areas critical to the accomplishment of Agency objectives. The level of research effort should be re-examined at frequent intervals.

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PART IV - SECTION H

OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE

I. Requirements and Systems Integration

A. The Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) has the responsibility to establish requirements for present systems operationally employed and for future systems, including the timing of their collection to be responsive to intelligence. These requirements must reflect our needs not only for strategic intelligence but also for early warning. Perhaps because of the nature of the collection devices, the DCI and the Board have a notable record of effective control over the last ten years. This has been true because this collection system lends itself to very direct guidance. But it is also unquestionably true that the participation of the DCI and the Board in this matter has been because of the sizeable costs involved, political and physical risks, and the very high productivity with its impressive impact on intelligence research and estimates of major concern to the policymakers. Whatever the

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reasons, this control must be continued and strengthened, being adapted to meet the ever changing demands of more sophisticated collection mechanisms.

B. The Board's concern, however, has lagged in taking into account the full impact once the results of the collection are available. True, the DCI and the Board did agree to establish a National Photographic Interpretation Center under NSCID 8, making what was previously an Agency facility more directly responsive to the needs of the community. Individually some agencies of the Government have engaged in extensive construction and development of photographic interpretation centers to meet their departmental needs and individual agencies have expanded their efforts in the field of SIGINT processing. But our projections for the future clearly show there must be a more vigorous effort toward resolving the various factors which contribute to our predicted inability to handle the massive amount of information which is portended for the future. These factors include the formatting of the information at the time of collection so that it may be integrated with previous

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materials and exploited by available hardware, the development and application of automatic data processing and other automation techniques to readout functions, and the coordination of the output of processing and exploitation for maximum efficient use by analysts. In the future, cost-effectiveness studies will have to be employed to aid the Board in discharging its responsibilities with full impact at the appropriate time.

II. Operations

A. The U-2 experience especially from 1955 to 1960, the first contemporary project of this Government in the overflight of denied areas of major and comprehensive significance, was a joint CIA-U. S. Air Force project under the executive direction of the CIA. All factors seem to point to the management relationship which was developed at that time by individuals in control in CIA (Mr. Dulles, General Cabell, and Mr. Bissell) whose background, experience, and talents were an important element in making that arrangement work.

B. We have tended to generalize this experience to all overhead reconnaissance without taking proper account of the unique factors at work.

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C. Again, the transfer of CORONA responsibility to the Agency at the termination of SAMOS was an extension of the management arrangements functioning in the U-2 case, a very heavy factor being the necessity to conduct the CORONA program as covertly as possible. However, the need was seen at that time to establish a national reconnaissance organization because of the obvious expansion of the Government's efforts in space fields bearing on reconnaissance. The plan extended the jointness then existing between CIA and the USAF, and therefore was still hydraheaded. Apart from the Air Force's historic role in the air, DoD assets were essential and the largest sums of money involved were directly related to installations and hardware normally their province.

D. If there is to be a national reconnaissance organization, it must be subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The latter must be in a position to exercise an influence in the operational circumstances of the NRO and this can be achieved, under his direction, without CIA operating all of

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the overflight programs. In this he gains additional strength from his responsibilities to the President and as Chairman of the Board in defining requirements and in exercising influence in the selection and use of reconnaissance capabilities. In the latter regard, it is a fair conclusion that the U-2 has been under the collection control of the Board except for the brief period in late 1962 and the recent situation in Southeast Asia.

However, it is to be noted that even when SAC (not CIA) has been overflying Cuba it has been subject to the Board's control to the degree necessary. It is quite clear that the control of KH-4 [] since the early stages of the operational status [] has been directly controlled by the Board. []

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E. The OXCART research and developmental stages seem in retrospect at those times and in those conditions to have been entirely a proper assignment to CIA. []

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[] And it may well be that there is no good reason why in those instances it needs to be operated by CIA.

F. It is proper and highly desirable that the Agency took the initiative in the development of ISINGLASS, but whether it needs to be operated by the Agency, if indeed it is to become operational, is not clear.

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I. The determination of operational responsibilities in the field of overflight reconnaissance cannot be judged from history alone nor from the claims regarding the relative bureaucratic excellence of the DoD or the CIA. In each case there will be required a reasoned examination of the factors obtaining at the time and a decision based on

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this process. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence will always be confronted with claims of their respective organizations. And these they will always have to resist in reaching a conclusion which is most viable and profitable for the United States Government. Their leadership and the climate of discussion which they establish and which they insist must prevail, will go far to make it possible for the DoD and the CIA to work closely together which is obviously essential.

III. Research and Development (R&D)

A. In strategic overhead reconnaissance, experience since 1955 (the development of the U-2) has amply demonstrated that the Director must maintain a capability in CIA for research and development in sensors and associated platforms to provide him with a dependable source of new and advanced ideas, to evaluate new proposals from any source, and to insure sufficient competition to permit choices. The Agency has a good research and development record both in terms of the fruitfulness of ideas and of the speed with which they have been

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brought to fruition. The research and development for the U-2, the
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capability are examples. Another R&D project of striking potential is
the development of [redacted] It is interesting that one of the con-
cerns of the Land Panel (of the President's Scientific Advisory Com-
mittee) in reviewing ISINGLASS is the absence of any competing projects.

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Apart from whatever determination is made on [redacted] it seems
quite clear that the initiative of the Agency in its exploration of new
systems [redacted] has exerted a useful pres-
sure on the NRO to develop a better or comparable system.

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B. The concept that the Director should have an R&D organi-
zation under his control involved in this area of research is generally
accepted. The present concept of funding for it, however, is not satis-
factory. Research and development of ideas up to the point where they
can be subjected to competitive examination or to cost-effectiveness
analysis should not be, as it is now, subject to exclusive funding con-
trol by an outside source such as the NRO. It is imperative either that
the funding for the Agency's R&D in this field should be established in

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its budget or that some greater flexibility in our relations with the NRO must be achieved.

IV. Recommendations. It is recommended that the mission role of the Central Intelligence Agency in strategic overhead reconnaissance programs be as follows:

A. To support the Director of Central Intelligence and the United States Intelligence Board

1. In establishing the requirements and the timing for on-going systems,

2. In selecting the systems which will provide maximum intelligence benefit with maximum economy, and

3. In insuring that the products of new systems provide materials and information in a form and with a timeliness which will permit effective use and integration with the products of other sources.

B. To operate overhead reconnaissance systems by assignment where special considerations demand.

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C. To fund and engage in research and development in sensors and associated platforms which can collect information from overhead, whether from a manned or unmanned vehicle. (This is not an exclusive assignment inasmuch as other agencies of the Government, specifically DoD agencies, will also be so engaged.)

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PART IV - SECTION I

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION

I. The problems of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) are among the most serious facing the Agency. They epitomize the "information explosion" which is venting through technical advances and which promises to burst upon the intelligence system when the capabilities for satellite reconnaissance come into fuller use. The accelerating technological revolution in its application to the collection of data is the overshadowing problem for long range planning. A correlative and urgent emphasis on the application of the technological revolution is required to meet the problems and opportunities created by it, viz., by research on the process of intelligence itself, automatic data processing, and systems analysis with its potential for control and balance, beginning at the all-important point of requirements or intelligence objectives.

II. The projections for personnel submitted by NPIC for the first five years of the long range plan accounted for approximately

of the increases projected for the Agency as a whole.

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Such increases for NPIC might well become mandatory if CIA's leading role in this centralized service is to be held and if the problem presented by NPIC is not met soon enough by the Agency's own systems analysis and program control.

III. The development of overhead reconnaissance - the huge investment in it and the incalculable value of the results from it - together with the advancing potential of this kind and system of collection warrant comparison with the development of communications intelligence during and after World War II. By analogy, CIA through NPIC should be thought of as having the opportunity now and for the foreseeable future to become for satellite reconnaissance what NSA belatedly became for communications intelligence. There are differences, not the least of which is the content of the information. Whereas at the moment satellite reconnaissance is more limited in kind of information than communications intelligence, it is potentially more complete in its kind than communications intelligence.

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may teach from the history of post-War communications intelligence as well as because of the magnitude of the reconnaissance effort and its importance for national intelligence.

IV. If the Agency is to maintain its proper role and if a proliferation of duplicating centers for interpretation is to be prevented, then CIA must provide a Center which is responsive and satisfactory to the military services as well as to its own needs. A key lies in superior research and development for successful automation, given the funds to make this possible on a basis of advancing technology.

V. Recommendations. It is recommended that:

A. The DCI give urgent attention to the imbalance between requirements for collection by overhead photography, particularly satellite, and the capacity of NPIC to provide effective photo interpretation;

B. Urgent attention be given to the application of research and development to meet the critical problems facing NPIC;

C. The Agency intensify efforts in recruitment and in the training of photo interpreters.

PART IV - SECTION J

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

I. Introduction

A. In the years ahead the Agency must undertake new, diverse, and distinctly more demanding responsibilities if it is to serve adequately the increasingly critical security interests of the U.S. How well it will be able to respond to these challenges depends in large part on how well we manage our human resources. In planning for the future, therefore, the CIA should recognize that its most valuable asset is its trained professional cadre of career personnel. These people provide the cutting edge for everything we do. Evolved over time, and conditioned by exposure to the disciplines and pressures of a demanding environment, they represent a unique body of talent. It behooves us to make certain that we sustain it and conserve it.

II. Discussion

A. We can be proud of the cadre of career personnel that conducts the business of this Agency today. As one senior Bureau of the Budget officer recently put it, "The CIA has the largest reservoir of highly trained and competent personnel in the Government." Key elements of this cadre began their professional careers during and

after World War II and constitute the "first generation" of CIA personnel. Others of this cadre were developed over later years with considerable efforts by top management, the career service boards, and the Offices of Personnel and Training. We have been particularly successful in the recruitment of young people for CIA. The establishment in 1951 of a Junior Officer Trainee (JOT) program has assured a regular input of highly qualified junior officers. Many of these young officers have fulfilled their high promise and form an increasingly large percentage of those officers selected for the mid-career training program. This program has been recognized as one of the finest of its type in the U.S. Government. It currently produces each year as of September 1965. This output should be expanded if we are to meet our needs in the years just ahead. Its program content likewise must be continually reviewed to assess possible changes for improvement.

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B. The mid-career program has been used as a vehicle for identifying those with a potential to become senior executives and for providing further training for them. This program has worked well but now needs increased emphasis and closer attention.

C. While at the senior levels the Agency has made creditable attempts to improve its managerial capacities, including executive training programs, this will not suffice for the future. The Agency

should therefore plan also for the early creation of an executive career service and a senior training program to sustain it.

D. In order to preserve the top-flight quality of its personnel cadre well into the "second generation" and to assure a vital continuity of leadership, we must, in addition to sustaining a regular input of young officers through the Career Trainee Program (formerly JOT) on which we have largely depended for officer recruitment since 1957, also encourage lateral entry at various levels of specialists and generalists. This practice would provide the new ideas and new blood that the Agency needs. A program of lateral entry cannot be haphazard but must be scheduled on a regular basis with stated goals and objectives. We must also recognize that certain needed disciplines and skills will remain in short supply. We should, for example, train our own photo interpreters if none can be recruited from the market.

E. It must also be recognized that the acquisition of many of the skills that the Agency requires need not involve long-term career employment. This is particularly true of the technical and scientific field where the "state-of-the-art" is moving so quickly and where, after several years, the scientist or technician hired on short-term arrangements by the Agency does well to return to his particular discipline in order to maintain his professional credentials and standing. Rather than

resist the efforts of persons with rare skills to return to academic or scientific discipline, the Agency should, where appropriate, accommodate them. In those circumstances where the Agency feels its interests are best served by retaining people with special skills on a long-term career basis who are desirous of remaining loyal to and retaining status in their particular disciplines, then it must take steps in the future to help them to do so. Specifically, the Agency must adopt a more flexible policy than it now has, in which academic sabbaticals, external training, acceptance of grants, and publication of works is not just allowed, but actually encouraged.

F. The Agency, in order to sustain the continued input of high caliber personnel, must plan for a more aggressive recruitment program and make use of the considerable latitude of its authorities to insure that CIA remains competitive in the increasingly tight professional labor market. The Agency should more clearly enunciate the fact that it is its policy to encourage the use of qualified senior personnel from the various directorates to assist directly and on a continuous basis in identifying and recruiting individuals of the same skills and disciplines. Managers of operating components should therefore take greater initiative to provide opportunities for them to do so, underwriting necessary travel and arranging work schedules to accommodate it.

We should note most particularly in planning for the future that the Agency's image and reputation will continue to have a very direct effect on the ability to recruit people.

G. Training in the Agency has not been and should not be restricted to formalized courses of instruction. Significant training consists of the in-house on-the-job variety throughout the directorates. This is so because many of the skills required by the Agency are either unique to it or must be developed to respond quickly to new requirements. Much that we have done in this field has been distinctly innovative, has reflected the "can do" philosophy of the Agency, and has spelled the difference between success or failure in many critical areas of our operations.

H. While the Agency has achieved commendable progress in the development of professional personnel, it must plan for an increased emphasis and a broader recognition of the need for it as well as a more systematic approach to professional training, particularly at the mid-career and senior levels. To be successful in this endeavor the Agency must more sharply define its needs. In any event, there should certainly be brought into being some form of rotation in executive positions within directorates and where appropriate between directorates in order to develop professionals with broader bases of experience. Such rotations

would open up new perspectives and provide new insights essential to an executive development concept. Extension of rotation to include other departments of the Government, particularly the Departments of Defense and State, pose significant collateral benefits for CIA.

I. Any executive development concept should include the creation of an executive career service under the DCI. This service should be created as soon as possible and should include senior echelons of the Agency, except specialists so uniquely qualified that they can and should be excluded from a general executive program. This executive cadre should have a regular inflow of officers identified as having executive potential. The latter, by assignment to the executive career service, automatically would be assured of opportunities for rotational assignments, executive training, and appropriate consideration for senior executive jobs within their own and other directorates. A senior training program should also include, as it has to a limited degree in the past, exposure to certain of the disciplines found in the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy of the Foreign Service Institute and in the National War College.

J. We recognize that there are organizational difficulties that would hamper the development of an executive career service particularly as it applies to the concept of rotation, but recommend,

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nonetheless, that immediate attention be given to it. Inherent in any executive career service would be the understanding that training would be more mandatory than permissive and that promotion to certain levels would depend on successful completion of prescribed training.

K. In light of the retirement exodus from the ranks of the present executive group of CIA which will start in just a few years, the Agency must address itself to the challenges of professional-cadre development with a certain sense of urgency. This task lies primarily in the years immediately ahead. It cannot be postponed, or attacked, in a leisurely sequence without risk of serious adverse impact in the decade beyond.

L. Hand-in-hand with the recruitment of qualified personnel and the institution of realistic and well ordered training mechanisms goes the equally important task of selection-out and retirement. The Agency must, beginning immediately, recognize that it cannot maintain a regular input of professionals into the Agency and expect to keep them unless it takes steps to assure the orderly and timely promotions that are inhibited by stagnation at higher levels. There should therefore be a much greater emphasis on selection-out of individuals who fail to meet standards or who are otherwise inadequate. There should be an efficient and thereby attractive out-placement system for those eligible

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for retirement or for those who must change their careers. Serious consideration should be given to CIA-sponsored external training to encourage such persons to leave the Agency in a manner beneficial to them and to the Agency.

M. The Agency should, finally, seek authority for the establishment of a training complement. In doing so, it would be following a practice routinely found in the military establishments. Any such complement that CIA possessed at one time has long since been dissipated because of the need to respond to mounting responsibilities and mounting demands on its human resources. The reinstitution of a training complement would assure a slender but vitally important reserve that we do not now enjoy. It would not only assure more orderly and planned training but would also, in effect, create a strength in depth to sustain us as we meet crises that will further strain our resources. These crises and their drain on manpower have inhibited the training and rotation that good management requires.

N. Prudence dictates that a large proportion of the manpower required over the next five years be acquired early in the period. The training establishment in being must be readied to expand; at the same time, early critical attention must be given to the creation of professional career development mechanisms of the type recommended above if the Agency is to get and keep the skilled careerists that it must have.

III. Recommendations. It is recommended that:

25X1A A. The Career Trainee Program be immediately expanded from to meet new requirements.

B. The Director authorize (1) the creation of an Executive Career Service which would include a system of rotation, and (2) the inauguration of a senior officer training program geared to the requirements of this Service.

C. Lateral entry of persons with wanted skills and disciplines in short supply into the Agency be given much greater emphasis by individual directorates to provide new blood the Agency needs.

D. Selection-out and retirement be given much greater emphasis in the near future and that strong efforts be made to create attractive and efficient out-placement mechanisms to include Agency-sponsored external training.

E. The Agency participate in the development of new methods of instruction (program learning) which give promise of great efficiency and economy in the future, particularly in language training.

F. The Agency clarify its language training needs and reorder its training facility to accommodate the anticipated increased requirements for training.

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G. The Agency seek authority to establish a training complement to assure a slender but vital reserve of manpower without which the career development mission of the Agency cannot be adequately accomplished.

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PART IV - SECTION K

MEDICAL VIEWS ON PLANNING AND HUMAN RESOURCES

I. Conservation of Manpower

The Agency is still in its first generation. Its founders are more than likely its planners. Twenty years have passed since the original founding. It must be conceded that the final phases of a long range plan will be left to others to accomplish.

While the second generation eagerly awaits its destiny, the Agency's best interests would be served if it could conserve its existing manpower.

It is not too soon to begin such action. The early effects of aging and stress are becoming evident in our people. The private awareness of physical change is a matter of daily discussion and communication. Medical findings confirm these observations.

At the same time, the Agency is subject to new and increasing pressures. The Agency is no longer in a rapidly expanding phase. The need to do more with less involves abrasive decisions. However, the climate of intelligence activities has become even more competitive and the risk of activities more threatening.

The continuing size of the burden and the limitations of our human resources, both imposed and acquired, indicate a strong need for the conservation of manpower. This may be accomplished in many ways.

A significant contribution can be made by the Office of Medical Services. The current trend to refine and increase the scope of diagnostic capabilities will result in the earlier detection of disease. The current slow expansion of examination capabilities can be accelerated to provide for a greater percentage of executive evaluations. Either or both of these developments will result in earlier referrals to specialists and private physicians.

In a major sense, however, the conservation of manpower is everyone's business. It is certainly the business of the employee and it is certainly in the interest of the supervisor. Hopefully, both supervisor and employee can become increasingly conscious of the need to conserve manpower.

Practical expressions of such attitudes could be expressed in the taking of needed annual leave, the avoidance of unrealistic deadlines, the use of sick leave when illness so dictates, and the avoidance of questionable overtime. There are other more complex manifestations that go beyond the scope of this paper. The Office of Medical Services

plans to contribute to increasing the managerial awareness of the needs for conservation of manpower through appropriate educational efforts.

II. Contributions to Personnel Management

The quality of performance of the Agency's first generation is fairly well known. The evidence is present in history and in the current status of the Agency and its accomplishments.

It is worthy of note that the bulk of Agency staffing has come about in response to exigencies. Original staffing stemmed from predecessor organizations born of war. The subsequent growth of the Agency for many years reflected the periodic threats and eruptions of international tensions. Even the pattern of recent growth, while technological in nature, is in response to exigencies representing threats of the greatest destruction.

The Agency was formed by people not necessarily born into the craft of intelligence or the atmosphere of clandestinity. Rather, the Agency obtained people from many walks of life and from many services. Their common attribute seemed to be the motivation to accomplish the Agency's mission.

The second generation has been acquired in different fashion. The Agency has gone about seeking deliberately for the young candidates of future leadership. Such individuals have been selected after the most

careful screening and evaluation. They experience prolonged periods of training and apprenticeship. It is only after extensive indoctrination that responsibilities of service are required.

How effective these methods are remains to be seen. The history of the second generation is yet to be written. In the ordinary course of events, the evidence will only become available after the heritage of responsibility has passed from present hands.

While it seems that the Agency is on the right track in its restaffing methods, the contrast between early and recent patterns of staffing remains evident. Perhaps the difference makes no difference; perhaps it is an advantage. We would be more comfortable if we actually knew.

To be sure the quality of on-duty performance is recorded periodically and evaluations are obtained in relationship to personnel actions. These measures are helpful and provide a degree of estimate and guidance for the future. Additional measures are possible, however, and worthy of exploration.

One such measure would be to link performance evaluations and selection procedures. At the present time, selection procedures have no organized or programed method available to compare the

qualities of actual performances with the findings of selection. There is no feed-back system. Such a system is needed to correct and improve selection methods. A second measure would be to use the linkage between selection procedures and performance evaluations to assist in guidance systems. The wealth of information that is obtained and is available as a result of selection mechanisms could make a significant contribution to measuring the quality of current performances and in suggesting some avenues and techniques for improvement.

A third measure could be to provide for the periodicity of application of these newer procedures. This periodicity might well vary in time and application according to the needs of career development systems. In general, such procedures would be applied only on those occasions and in those instances when total scrutiny would profit a career service or assist in the management of individuals.

At the present time, the Office of Medical Services is considering the implications of linking selection and evaluation procedures and will be presenting the subject with recommendations to the Deputy Director for Support.

There is a second major area of possible development that is worthy of mention. It seems feasible for behavioral disciplines to

provide managers and supervisors with insights into human behavior. While good managers are generally good students of human nature, their natural abilities could be augmented by technical understandings.

This is by no means a new idea. Many management courses provide for such experiences in their curriculum. The effects are generally short-lived due to the isolated nature of the experience.

More recently, the idea has found expression in universities where the faculty has been joined by behavioral disciplines to assist in the formative process that results in education.

In this Agency, with its needs to know about human nature, it seems desirable that a similar relationship be attempted.

The Office of Medical Services will be taking the initiative to provide training and consultative opportunities to management within reasonable limitations.

The foregoing concepts and plans provide one approach to the subject of improving personnel maintenance and development systems. There is a great deal of interest and energy available in the Agency in regard to the subject. It is possible that this approach may link up with other efforts and contribute to the goal of building a system of personnel management that equals and relates to the system of personnel selection.

PART IV - SECTION L

COMMUNICATIONS

I. Discussion

A. The Agency operates and should continue to operate its own world-wide communications network not only because it is a function

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continuing large effort in the communications field. This is not to say that commercial, defense, and other governmental circuits, equipments, and techniques cannot be utilized in the Agency's world-wide system, but that every message containing Agency-obtained intelligence or that can be attributed to the Agency's operations must be handled by CIA personnel while it is in the clear text form. This need for maximum communications security is obvious when applied to the actual transmission of reports by an agent to his Clandestine Services case officer, but not so obvious in its applicability to staff communications and to messages or data collected by "black boxes" of the future.

B. Any discussion of the Agency's communications program must recognize the fact that for economic, cover, and transmission

security reasons our communications network must continue to be responsive also to outside-the-Agency requirements in addition to our own requirements.

Our role

in the Critical Intelligence Communications Network will continue and expand, and our continued participation in the National Communications System (NCS) will be required. These outside factors are not all "give" on the part of the Agency--there's a lot of "take" involved too.

Via the NCS we obtain the benefits of vast amounts of effort and moneys spent on development of, and operation of, new circuits--e. g. , transoceanic cables now and satellites in the near future.

II. Plans For The Future

The technology to permit the Agency to communicate in a secure, reliable, high speed, high volume fashion is presently available or is on the near horizon. These requirements can be met by the Agency provided they are identified sufficiently far in advance so that equipment

and manpower can be programmed. Planning for the future includes these major items:

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A. Increase the use of automated equipment

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to speed the flow of traffic and reduce the workload impact of higher volumes.

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B. Continue efforts to improve the security of communications centers, transmission systems, cryptographic devices, and terminal equipments

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C. Expand the technical training program to maintain harmony with increased automation.

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continue the development of a decentralized telecommunications plan which minimizes the dependence on any single facility and insures a capability of meeting agent communications requirements of the Clan-destine Services.

E. Expand the CIA communications system to provide voice quality circuitry for the transmission and reception of secure voice, data, and facsimile communications in addition to the teletypewriter service now provided.

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III. Problem Areas

A. No look at the Agency's long range communications program can ignore the interdependent problems of volumes and speed of service. Everyone knows that volumes of message traffic have increased year by year and that the demands for more and more detailed intelligence reporting will increase these volumes. Demands for "real-time" service from collection to consumer will force our communications system to expand greatly in order to transport, electrically, much of the material that is today transmitted from one point to another by plane, train or boat. Currently, real-time communications are centered around the demand for secure voice and facsimile systems in the Washington area and a few computer-to-computer data links. The future holds forth the possibility for and probable requirements for secure voice, data, facsimile, and even television with the intelligence community and with our own posts on a world-wide basis. The control of this persistent increase in requirements for higher volumes cannot be accomplished by the Agency's Support mechanism other than by the

inherent restrictions on manpower and money. The Support elements have, and should have, a "you call--we haul" posture toward the rest of the Agency. Control of traffic volumes must be exercised by those Agency components which are responsible for the substantive side of CIA's mission.

B. Another critical area that can be classified as a communications problem is right here in the headquarters building and is probably more rightfully classified as a reproduction and distribution problem. We have a multiplicity of registries, secretariats, etc. for handling the many varieties of correspondence that flow in and out of the building. There is no uniformity even within the one category of overseas correspondence; cables are handled one way and dispatches another. If, as we believe, much of the material that is presently pouched is destined to be handled electrically in the future, the reproduction and distribution systems should certainly be paralleled if not combined with due regard to the security requirements of the Clandestine Services. The State Department is far ahead of us in this field, with a central method of distributing its Telegrams and Airgrams. Also, the distribution of correspondence within the building must be automated, and the need for interfacing our electrical communications

system with automatic data handling is, of course, obvious. It now takes longer to get cables from the message center to headquarters elements than it does to get them from halfway around the world to the message center.

IV. Recommendations. It is recommended that studies be undertaken immediately to develop measures for:

A. Controlling the constantly increasing volume of communications originated by Agency elements, and,

B. Faster and more efficient handling of correspondence and communications within CIA headquarters.

PART IV - SECTION M

SECURITY PROBLEMS - LONG RANGE PLANNING

I. The Office of Security is constantly striving to improve security in all of its fields. Technical developments, sociological change, and possible realignment of international forces will require changes in our security techniques and procedures. These unique problems must be met with a high degree of sophistication in the security field. Some of the future problems can be identified by manifestations appearing at this time. Others cannot. Accordingly, this paper will address itself to future security problems which are either with us at the present time and will continue to be problems, or those which can be anticipated with some degree of certainty.

II. Investigations and Operational Support

A. The conduct of inter-agency name checks will, in the future, be made through the medium of automatic data processing equipment. This anticipated development will require long range planning on the part of the Office of Security in order that we may reap the benefits from such automated developments, but at the same time protect the security of Agency information and sources.

III. Physical Security

A. The physical protection of CIA installations and personnel abroad will be a continuing problem. The prominent power position of the U. S. will continue to subject its overseas personnel to increased numbers of demonstrations, riots, or acts of violence together with their attendant security problems. Long range planning must take this into account in order to provide additional security on a continuing basis.

B. The ever increasing cost of guard protection of Agency buildings should be reduced through the use of technological advances in the field of personal identification. It is anticipated that by continuing effort, the state of the art in this field can be advanced so as to yield the desired security results. Automatic and instantaneous fingerprint processing is one of possibilities toward the achievement of this security goal.

IV. Counterintelligence

A. Within the framework of the present world power structure, considerable emphasis in the security field has been given to the threats presented by the currently identified -- Communist oriented -- opposition. Security techniques, practices, and procedures must be sensitive to any new penetration efforts on the part of other nations which may affect the security of the Agency.

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
Necessary security measures must be developed on a timely basis in order to meet any new, developing threats. In cooperation with the Counterintelligence Staff, DDP, necessary security measures must be developed on a timely basis in order to meet any new developing threats.

V. Polygraph

A. There has been much congressional interest in connection with the use of the polygraph. In this connection, the validity of the polygraph has been challenged and is being carefully evaluated.


B. Appropriate research will be necessary in order to improve the security benefits which can be derived by stress measurements. It is felt that considerable advancement in the state of the art of the polygraph technique is possible.

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VI. Industrial Security

A. Until the present time there has been little evidence of concerted opposition efforts to penetrate industrial facilities performing classified Government contracts. With the increased importance of technology in the intelligence field and with increased dependence by the intelligence community on industrial assistance, it is anticipated that opposition efforts in this connection will be materially increased. Future security policies, procedures, and techniques must address themselves to this problem and produce the necessary security protection.

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VIII. Personnel Security

A. In order for the Agency to stay abreast of new developments in the intelligence field it will be necessary to process security clearances in large numbers on a continuing basis. Increased efforts on the part of the opposition to penetrate CIA will require a continuing vast expenditure of manpower in order to yield the necessary degree of personnel security. Additional emphasis will be required to carry out a current reinvestigation program of staff employees, consultants, and contractor personnel.

IX. Automatic Data Processing

A. All Office of Security programs must be geared so as to accrue the greatest benefits from automation. The most serious problem is the development of systems for the easy and effective in-put of security data into a format which can be automated and retrieved at a later date, compatible with the needs of all Agency components involved.

X. Protection of Intelligence

A. "Leaks of information" will continue to pose a threat to the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Efforts to combat such disclosures must continue to be exercised

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through the USIB, with continued emphasis upon the realization that the cooperation of all departments and agencies will be required to produce the necessary degree of success in this security effort.

B. The degree of protection afforded classified information is only as strong as the lowest standards maintained within the recipient agencies. Recent revelations of espionage have shown that all agencies are affected by the penetration of any one community agency. CIA is, therefore, continually striving through the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board to develop uniform security criteria and standards for use by all member agencies in the intelligence community.

XI. Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

A. CIA increase research and development for improvement of the polygraph instrument and its utilization in order to obtain the utmost benefits through this security aid in support of intelligence operations and activities.

B. The Security Committee of USIB promulgate uniform personnel and physical security practices and procedures in all areas wherein community intelligence activities and personnel are affected.

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PART V

CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS

In the following consolidated recommendations of the report reference is made to those sections to which the recommendations relate.

I. Clandestine Services (Part III, Section A)

It is recommended that:

A. In order to fulfill its unique and critical role, the Clandestine Services function within CIA with that degree of isolation necessary to insure that the U.S. has a truly clandestine and covert action service. At the same time, it must remain responsive to the Director's needs for information about its objectives, programs, needs, and accomplishments.

B. The Clandestine Services concentrate on operations to accomplish agent penetrations for acquisition of information related as closely as possible to plans and intentions of hostile regimes.

C. Officers who are destined for truly clandestine careers should, in necessary instances, be trained separately from other trainees who are not to follow a career of sensitive activity.

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E. Clandestine Services manpower be increased in three categories: (a) ongoing necessary normal expansion, (b) a contingency development cadre for use on short notice in critical areas, (c) clandestine operational research.

F. The DD/P, in order to protect its agents and operations from compromise, retain control of its agent-collected information and such operational support mechanisms and related machine data processing, as well as the function of its Technical Services Division.

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G. The Clandestine Services Personnel Division be transferred from the DD/S to the DD/P, to enable him to possess and direct the essential tool for fulfilling his management role with the maximum flexibility so necessary to his unique mission.

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II. Intelligence Production (Part III, Section B)

It is recommended that:

A. Long range objectives for the production of intelligence
be approved:

1. To strengthen the Agency capability for
24-hour current intelligence and the development of the
Operations Center in connection therewith;

2. To strengthen the CIA strategic base in
research and extend it in political intelligence; and

3. To increase CIA's analytical strength
against Communist China during the next five years in
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B. The Directorates review their organizations for the
production of finished intelligence and, in collaboration with the perma-
nent planning staff submit their recommendations for improvement.

III. Overt Collection and Reference Services (Part III, Section C)

It is recommended that:

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IV. The CIA Image (Part IV, Section A)

It is recommended that:

A. The Agency intensify its briefings on its organization, objectives, and mission to appropriate members of the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government;

B. A systematic program be instituted for better understanding of the Agency in the academic and business world; and

C. A program for better use of Agency alumni be developed.

V. Automatic Data Processing and Analysis (Part IV, Section E)

It is recommended that:

A. The DCI direct each Deputy Director to assign two or three individuals to work full time on the ADP problem, and to review the application of ADP to his operations and processes as a matter of high priority, and to submit within 90 days a phased and costed program.

B. The CIA Planning Staff prepare within 120 days a phased and costed Agency program for ADP, based on Directorate submissions, for review by the Executive Director-Comptroller and approval by the DCI.

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C. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology be directed by the DCI to implement the approved Agency ADP program as executive agent and to act as Chairman of an ADP executive coordination committee consisting of the Deputy Directors concerned. The committee should report to the DCI quarterly.

D. The DD/S&T establish and staff an intelligence sciences laboratory to study and apply on an experimental basis new techniques in ADP and analysis to Agency programs as a service of common concern.

VI Systems Analysis (Part IV, Section F)

It is recommended that:

A. CIA employ systems analysis in the selection and evaluation of major intelligence programs.

B. Responsibility for ensuring that systems analysis is applied to selected programs and for providing technical assistance and guidance be assigned to a planning staff, separate from but in close consultation with BPAM.

C. Several projects be selected for trial of systems analysis sometime within the next six months [] 25X1A

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D. A program be established for training selected CIA managerial personnel in systems analysis.

VII. Scientific Research (Part IV, Section G)

It is recommended that:

A. Budget submissions and records identify funds allocated to research as distinct from development;

B. Research funds be budgeted and allocated centrally; and

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C. The Agency set aside operating budget for scientific research in areas critical to the accomplishment of Agency objectives and the level of research re-examined at frequent intervals.

VIII. Overhead Reconnaissance (Part IV, Section H)

It is recommended that:

A. The mission role of the Central Intelligence Agency in strategic overhead reconnaissance programs be as follows:

1. To support the Director of Central Intelligence and the United States Intelligence Board

a. In establishing the requirements and timing for on-going systems,

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- b. In selecting the systems which will provide maximum intelligence benefit with maximum economy, and
 - c. In insuring that the products of new systems provide materials and information in a form and with a timeliness which will permit effective use and integration with the products of other sources.
2. To operate overhead reconnaissance systems by assignment where special considerations demand.
3. To fund and engage in research and development in sensors and associated platforms which can collect information from overhead, whether from a manned or unmanned vehicle. (This is not an exclusive assignment inasmuch as other agencies of the Government, specifically DoD agencies, will also be so engaged.)

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IX. National Photographic Interpretation (Part IV, Section I)

It is recommended that:

A. The DCI give urgent attention to the imbalance between requirements for collection of overhead photography, particularly satellite, and the capacity of NPIC to provide effective photographic interpretation.

B. Urgent attention be given to the application of research and development to meet the critical problems facing NPIC.

C. The Agency intensify efforts in the recruitment and in the training of photo interpreters.

X. Personnel and Training (Part IV, Section J)

It is recommended that:

A. The Career Trainee Program be expanded immediately from its current annual to meet new requirements.

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B. The Director authorize (a) the creation of an Executive Career Service which would include a system of rotation, and (b) the inauguration of a senior officer training program geared to the requirements of this service.

C. Lateral entry of persons with wanted skills and disciplines in short supply into the Agency be given much greater emphasis by individual Directorates.

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D. Selection-out and retirement be given much greater emphasis in the near future and that strong efforts be made to create attractive and efficient out-placement mechanisms to include Agency-sponsored external training.

E. The Agency participate in the development of new methods of instruction (program learning) which give promise of great efficiency and economy in the future, particularly in language training.

F. The Agency clarify its language training needs and reorder its training facility to accommodate anticipated requirements for training reflected in the Long Range Plan.

G. The Agency seek authority to establish a training complement to assure a slender but vital reserve of manpower without which the career development mission of the Agency cannot be adequately accomplished.

XI. Communications (Part IV, Section L)

It is recommended that:

A. Studies be undertaken immediately to develop means for:

1. Controlling the constantly increasing volume of communications originated by Agency elements, and

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2. Faster and more efficient handling of
correspondence and communications within CIA
Headquarters.

XII. Security (Part IV, Section M)

It is recommended that:

A. Research and development be increased for improvement
of the polygraph instrument and its utilization in order to obtain the
utmost benefits through this security aid in support of intelligence
operations and activities.

B. The Security Committee of USIB promulgate uniform
personnel and physical security practices and procedures in all areas
wherein community intelligence activities and personnel are affected.

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
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
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


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
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